data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-98547 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-98547

af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()

Published 2026-10-18 (today) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/packet. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-98547 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.113-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.113-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.9-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.9-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.9-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.9-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic: mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024); If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0 as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through (and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it). 0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps (div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047. The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1, so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and [1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this doesn't blow up for everyone. What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc(): p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...)); hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution: if (interval < hrtimer_resolution) interval = hrtimer_resolution; So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone. The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net: af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a 0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer conversion turned it into. (Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.) Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works): int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)); bind(fd, ...); int v = TPACKET_V3; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v)); struct tpacket_req3 req = { .tp_block_size = 0x10000000, .tp_block_nr = 1, .tp_frame_size = 2048, .tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048, .tp_retire_blk_tov = 0, }; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)); Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a different fix, just say so and I'll respin.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/packet/af_packet.c

What this is
PACKET SOCKETSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/packet/af_packet.c · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_PACKET /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_PACKET

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-10-18 (today)source
CVSS
no vector published, unrated
Attack vector
not published
EPSS
not scored
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/packet

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.25.10.27102afd75649a4
3.25.15.222eb5b3838b920
3.26.1.189297acc571d58
3.26.6.158be1aacff399d
3.26.12.112b2bcc6a254d6
3.26.18.556279211e7d24
3.27.2.9218a944b9e03
3.27.356d82862a0a2

Why the CNA scored it this way

The kernel CNA published no CVSS vector and no reasoning for CVE-2026-98547, which is why it is shown as unrated rather than given an invented score. 6,405 of the 20,413 CVEs here carry reasoning; this is not one of them.