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CVE-2026-98173
smb: client: fix use-after-free of iface in cifs_try_adding_channels()
Published 2026-10-06 (13 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/smb. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-98173 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6568-1 · 2026-10-16 · text | 6.12.113-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6568-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-16, in 6.12.113-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.8-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.8-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.8-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.8-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
cifs_try_adding_channels() iterates ses->iface_list with list_for_each_entry_safe_from(), which captures the next entry (niface) under iface_lock. The loop body then drops iface_lock for the whole duration of cifs_ses_add_channel(). A concurrent interface refresh (SMB3_request_interfaces() -> parse_server_interfaces()) marks all ifaces inactive and removes and frees any that are not re-advertised via list_del() + kref_put(), where release_iface() is a bare kfree(). Since niface typically has no channel holding a reference, the list reference is its last and it can be freed inside the unlocked window. On continue, the iterator advance step then dereferences niface->iface_head.next, and the loop body reads iface->rdma_capable/is_active, both on freed memory. Fix this by never keeping an unreferenced list pointer across the unlocked window. Each channel attempt now re-scans the list from the head under iface_lock, takes a kref on the selected candidate, and passes only that referenced candidate to cifs_ses_add_channel(). weight_fulfilled still tracks selection progress, so restarting the scan preserves the original weighted distribution and the weight_fulfilled-before-kref_put ordering on the failure path. Add a per-pass attempts cap so a flapping interface refresh cannot keep the inner loop spinning within a single tries increment.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/smb/client/sess.c
- What this is
- COMMON INTERNET FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CIFS and SMB3)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/smb/client/ · linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- cifs
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_CIFS|CONFIG_SMBFS' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w cifsPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_CIFS, CONFIG_SMBFS
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-10-06 (13 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.33%, higher than 24.0% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- fs/smb
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.19 | 6.12.112 | c941f1ebfd26 |
| 5.19 | 6.18.54 | e99040e5e9c6 |
| 5.19 | 7.2.8 | ec36b38e6559 |
| 5.19 | 7.3 | d034e836eefd |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DSA-6568-1 | 2026-10-16 | trixie 6.12.113-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- A malicious SMB server sends the bad data over TCP/445 in its FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO responses. A later response leaves out an interface, so parse_server_interfaces() does list_del() and kref_put() and frees it. cifs_try_adding_channels() still holds niface after dropping iface_lock for cifs_ses_add_channel(), and that pointer now refers to freed memory.
- AC:HAttack complexity, high
- Multichannel is off by default (multichannel=false, max_channels=1), so the victim must mount with multichannel or max_channels>1. The server also has to line up a refresh from the 600s smb2_query_server_interfaces worker with the unlocked add-channel window. It can stall channel setup and force reconnects to retry, but it does not schedule the worker.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The attacker only runs a rogue SMB server and needs no account or privilege on the victim client. The interface list is server-supplied data the client trusts during the session it opened.
- UI:RUser interaction, required
- A victim or admin has to mount a share from the attacker's server with multichannel turned on. CIFS mounts are not FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so the attacker cannot set up the client side alone.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The memory corruption stays inside the client kernel's own security authority. No VM or other trust boundary is crossed.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- The loop continues through freed niface->iface_head.next and reads iface->rdma_capable, is_active, speed and sockaddr from the freed cifs_server_iface. The attacker can refill that heap object with their own data, which lets the kernel follow attacker-chosen pointers.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Once the freed entry is reallocated, the loop does kref_get() and weight_fulfilled++/num_channels++ through the stale or forged iface pointer. That is a kernel write at a location the attacker influences, and cifs_ses_add_channel() then uses the forged object.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Dereferencing the freed list entry in cifs_try_adding_channels() can oops or panic the client. The server can force reconnects to re-enter this path repeatedly.