CVE-2026-98123

What the bug is

sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset. When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061 section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate does not help). The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of the parameter, an out-of-bounds read. Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061. The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at Tencent Yunding Lab.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c

What this is

SCTP PROTOCOLMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sctp/ · linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Kernel module

sctp

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_IP_SCTP /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w sctp

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m

m

a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted

Build switch

CONFIG_IP_SCTP

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-09-25 (24 days ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.18%, higher than 6.8% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

net/sctp

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
2.6.12	5.10.271	ba54cad22997
2.6.12	5.15.222	7d8e7ab6a066
2.6.12	6.1.189	5fbc6a778d5f
2.6.12	6.6.158	4548d843e7b2
2.6.12	6.12.111	abf59d7f6fff
2.6.12	6.18.53	3be02999ab91
2.6.12	7.2.7	7ba84e2971d2
2.6.12	7.3	2cb0b0b1ed69

Debian advisories