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CVE-2026-98069

net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()

8.1 EPSS 0.6% AV:N

Published 2026-09-25 (24 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/rds. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-98069 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run concurrently with the teardown. The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock, but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write, and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings (e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the transmit state under it. Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing - by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed. Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill(). The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them. rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING. Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued there - accept processing for other connections and network namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop() during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now noted next to those cancels (on ---truncated---

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/rds/connection.c
net/rds/ib_recv.c
net/rds/send.c
net/rds/tcp.c

What this is
RDS - RELIABLE DATAGRAM SOCKETSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/rds/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
rds

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_RDS /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w rds

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_RDS

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-25 (24 days ago)source
CVSS
8.1 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.57%, higher than 46.0% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/rds

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.375.10.2717f4f21e4439d
2.6.375.15.2221f900f585cbb
2.6.376.1.18932e21bcf4b5b
2.6.376.6.1582e46248e375a
2.6.376.12.1117febb113795d
2.6.376.18.53900e96c9749a
2.6.377.2.71fe627e5db5c
2.6.377.3813f3582ac7a

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
A remote RDS/TCP peer on port 16385 drives both sides of the race: RDS ping messages make rds_recv_incoming() call rds_send_pong() and so rds_send_xmit(), and the peer's own FIN/RST reaches rds_tcp_state_change() and then rds_conn_path_drop(), which queues rds_conn_shutdown(). The damaged state is that connection's transmit state and TCP socket.
AC:HAttack complexity, high
The attacker can start sends and teardowns at will, but the sender only overlaps the teardown if the test_bit() wait in rds_conn_shutdown() and the state recheck in rds_send_xmit() both miss each other's store. That needs a weakly ordered CPU and a narrow reordering window the attacker cannot control.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
rds_tcp_accept_one() accepts RDS/TCP connections from any peer address with no authentication, so pings and connection drops need no credentials. A local user can also reach it without privilege, since AF_RDS socket creation has no capability check and SO_RDS_TRANSPORT autoloads rds_tcp.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim action is needed. The attacker sends the pings and resets the connection themselves.
S:UScope, unchanged
The race and its memory corruption stay inside the kernel's own security authority. No guest/host or other boundary is crossed.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
rds_send_xmit()/rds_tcp_xmit() can keep using tc->t_sock after rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown() has called sock_release() on it, and can keep using cp_xmit_rm while rds_send_path_reset() rewrites it. Both are use-after-free on socket and message objects, which could be groomed into kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The transmit path writes through a freed struct socket/sock, and through transmit and ring state (IB rings zeroed by rds_ib_ring_init()) that the teardown is rewriting at the same time. That is a heap memory-corruption primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Losing the race crashes the kernel: the commit cites BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled() and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler(), and the TCP path can dereference a released socket.