data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-98027

net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bound the policy rule dump by the caller's buffer size

7.0 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-09-25 (24 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-98027 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

mv88e6xxx_get_rxnfc() uses rxnfc->rule_cnt as the write index while dumping the policy IDR, clobbering the input value before it has been looked at. That input is the number of entries the caller had room for. ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL requires no CAP_NET_ADMIN and the ioctl sizes the buffer from the rule_cnt userspace passes in, so once an admin has installed policy rules any user can ask for fewer slots than there are rules and run off the end of the allocation. A rule_cnt of 0 leaves the buffer pointer NULL and the walk dereferences it. Count into a local so the caller's limit survives the walk, and stop with -EMSGSIZE once it is reached.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c

What this is
MARVELL 88E6XXX ETHERNET SWITCH FABRIC DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
mv88e6xxx

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_NET_DSA|CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w mv88e6xxx

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, i386/686, i386/686-pae, i386/rt/686-pae, ppc64el/powerpc64le
  • trixieMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, armel/rpi, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
  • forky, sidMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_NET_DSA, CONFIG_NET_DSA_MV88E6XXX
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-25 (24 days ago)source
CVSS
7.0 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.12%, higher than 1.8% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.45.10.2717e4bfc5f0b66
5.45.15.22201124cd2cf4b
5.46.1.189609c4378f212
5.46.6.158c5b5c52b6524
5.46.12.11144cd4674d9aa
5.46.18.537a683c2b0628
5.47.2.7cda5ac8fe8ac
5.47.3b1fffc273112

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The overflow is reached only through the local SIOCETHTOOL ioctl: dev_ethtool() -> ethtool_get_rxnfc() -> dsa_user_get_rxnfc() -> mv88e6xxx_get_rxnfc(ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL). The bad input is the rule_cnt field of the ethtool_rxnfc struct the user passes in. No network packet reaches this path.
AC:HAttack complexity, high
The OOB write only happens if policy rules already exist in chip->policies for that DSA port. Those are installed by an admin via ETHTOOL_SRXCLSRLINS, which needs CAP_NET_ADMIN over the hardware port. The attacker can't create that state. Once rules exist, a small rule_cnt triggers it deterministically.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
dev_ethtool() lists ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL among the commands exempt from the ns_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) check. Any unprivileged local user who can see the mv88e6xxx user port in their netns can issue the ioctl.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker makes the ioctl call and picks rule_cnt themselves. No other user has to do anything.
S:UScope, unchanged
The corruption hits the kernel heap in the same kernel that runs the attacker's ioctl. No VM, IOMMU or other authority boundary is crossed.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
ethtool_get_rxnfc() sizes rule_buf with kcalloc(rule_cnt, 4) from the user's value. The driver then overwrites rxnfc->rule_cnt with the real rule count, so ethtool_rxnfc_copy_to_user() copies that many u32s from the undersized buffer, reading past the slab object into userspace. The same heap corruption can also be groomed to leak more.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
mv88e6xxx_get_rxnfc() writes rule_locs[rxnfc->rule_cnt++] = id for every rule on the port with no bound, so u32 IDs go past a kmalloc object whose size and cache the attacker chose via rule_cnt. That heap OOB write can corrupt neighbouring objects.
A:HAvailability impact, high
With rule_cnt=0, ethtool_get_rxnfc() passes a NULL rule_buf and the IDR walk writes through it, oopsing the kernel on demand. Larger overflows corrupt slab memory and can panic the system. Either can be repeated.