CVE-2026-97997

What the bug is

In a packed ring the AVAIL and USED bits sit in the descriptor itself, so writing them makes that descriptor available. Those bit combinations flip meaning on every round of the ring, tracked by a wrap counter, so invalidating or validating a descriptor means inverting both bits. Commit 1ce9e6055fa0 ("virtio_ring: introduce packed ring support") has virtqueue_add_packed() make every descriptor of a chain available as it maps the chain, and write the head last. The device consumes the ring in order and stops at a head that is not available yet, so it never reaches the rest. When vring_map_one_sg() fails partway, unmap_release unmaps the segments and restores avail_used_flags, but the descriptors it wrote to in the ring stay marked with AVAIL and USED bits. The head is now the only entry that keeps the device from consuming these stale entries. For example, the ring would look like this now. Z - pre-previous command A - previous command B - aborted command C - current command [A1 DONE] [A2 DONE] <C1 EMPTY> [B2] [B3] [Z1 DONE] When the driver now attempts to issue the C command, the next add starts at the same head as B. If C spans less descriptors than B, there is no end marker because AVAIL and USED bits were still in place. And that means the device will start interpreting these stale entries (B2/B3) as another command entry, which then blocks the queue. This effect typically happens in swiotlb configurations under memory pressure, because vring_map_one_sg() can then fail with larger I/O requests which then leads to command abortions. There are broadly 2 ways to avoid leaving those flags behind: 1) Defer those flags too until the chain is complete. 2) Rewrite those flags for the previous wrap counter. Implement the second option in both packed add paths. The first option traverses the chain a second time on every successful add. The second option invalidates all added descriptors when any add fails. With this patch applied, a packed virtqueue keeps completing requests after a failed add.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c

What this is

VIRTIO COREMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/virtio/ · virtualization@lists.linux.dev · Maintained

Kernel module

virtio_ring

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_VIRTIO /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w virtio_ring

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

• bookwormb
• trixie, forky, sidy

b

built in on some flavours, a module on others

y

built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Build switch

CONFIG_VIRTIO

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-09-25 (24 days ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.17%, higher than 5.5% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

drivers/virtio

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
5.0	6.18.57	3e6400e3b8b8
5.0	7.2.7	d595358276b6
5.0	7.3	75d276e5bb68