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CVE-2026-97910

ASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-25 (24 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem sound/soc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

Debian does not build this code. The per-release build detail is under "Where it lives" below.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-97910 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

sprd_platform_compr_open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data area) and the stage 1 DDR buffer (2M data area) with fixed sizes, but sprd_platform_compr_copy() derives all copy lengths from the user controlled runtime->fragment_size and the write() count, never comparing them against the physical buffer sizes. The compress core only checks fragment_size * fragments for an u32 overflow in snd_compress_check_input(), so a local user can configure a logical buffer of up to ~4GB via SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS, far exceeding the fixed allocations. A fragment_size larger than the 32K IRAM data area makes the stage 0 copy_from_user() overflow past the IRAM allocation, and a buffer_size larger than the 2M DDR buffer makes the wrapping copy at the end of sprd_platform_compr_copy() write fully user controlled data past the buffer. No SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START is needed, a write() in SETUP state reaches the copy callback directly. Reject parameters that do not fit into the fixed buffers in set_params(), and fix the advertised max fragment size: 128K never fitted into the 32K IRAM buffer. The caps values may have been carried over from the qdsp6 driver, which allocates its buffers according to the advertised maxima, unlike this driver. With 32K as max fragment size the advertised limits are self-consistent: 32K * 64 = 2M equals the DDR buffer size. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

sound/soc/sprd/sprd-pcm-compress.c

What this is
SOUND - SOC LAYER / DYNAMIC AUDIO POWER MANAGEMENT (ASoC)MAINTAINERS section matched on sound/soc/ · linux-sound@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
none to look for. The file would have gone into snd_soc_sprd_platform, and Debian does not compile it into that module, so finding snd_soc_sprd_platform in lsmod would say nothing about this CVE.

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_SND|CONFIG_SND_SOC|CONFIG_SND_SOC_SPRD' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian does not build this code. In 5 releases below, every kernel flavour Debian publishes has the switch off, so the vulnerable file is compiled into no kernel binary Debian ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12n
n
not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code
Build switches
CONFIG_SND, CONFIG_SND_SOC, CONFIG_SND_SOC_SPRD
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-25 (24 days ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 4.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
sound/soc

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.25.10.2712fada8276117
5.25.15.222ad796a1bc187
5.26.1.1892e27144ba4b9
5.26.6.1581467e3989c6e
5.26.12.11138a9bb5221bc
5.26.18.53ff63b0adc4f6
5.27.2.78064b73997f1
5.27.37a4ce92d150b

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bad values come from a local process holding an open /dev/snd/comprCxDy node. It sets fragment_size/fragments with the SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS ioctl and picks the count in write() (snd_compr_write -> sprd_platform_compr_copy). No remote protocol carries this data.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
snd_compress_check_input() only checks fragment_size*fragments for u32 overflow, and before the fix sprd_platform_compr_set_params() had no size check at all. The attacker picks fragment_size >32K or a buffer >2M, then write()s in SETUP state, and the overflow happens every time. There is no race and nothing depends on hardware state.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Opening the compress offload node needs only the ordinary device-file access given to audio clients: the audio group on Unisoc Android builds, or the seat user's uaccess ACL on generic Linux. No capability is checked along set_params or write.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker opens the device, sets parameters and writes data entirely on their own. No other user has to do anything.
S:UScope, unchanged
A kernel memory overflow reached from a local process stays inside the kernel's own security authority. No VM, IOMMU or sandbox boundary is crossed.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
copy_from_user() writes fully controlled data past the 32K IRAM area or the 2M+1K DDR compr_buffer, and the length is also controlled. That corrupts adjacent kernel memory, which is enough to build a read primitive and leak kernel data.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
In sprd_platform_compr_copy(), both the stage 0 copy (fragment_size - received_stage0 past iram_buffer) and the wrapping DDR copy (data_count - avail_bytes into compr_buffer.area) write attacker data of attacker-chosen length past a fixed allocation. That is an out-of-bounds write that can lead to privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Overwriting the DMA link lists, the DSP playinfo area or neighbouring pages with megabytes of attacker data reliably crashes the kernel or the audio DSP. A single write() is enough.