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CVE-2026-97611

net: openvswitch: fix use-after-free of the flow table mask array

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-25 (24 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/openvswitch. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-97611 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.7-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.7-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

tbl_mask_array_realloc() retires the old mask_array before it stops being reachable: old = ovsl_dereference(tbl->mask_array); if (old) { ... call_rcu(&old->rcu, mask_array_rcu_cb); } rcu_assign_pointer(tbl->mask_array, new); call_rcu() only waits for read-side critical sections already in flight. tbl->mask_array still points at old between the call_rcu() and the rcu_assign_pointer(), so a reader entering ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_stats() in that window picks up old in a fresh critical section that the pending grace period does not cover. tbl_mask_array_realloc() runs in process context under ovs_mutex, so the window is preemptible and can outlast the grace period. Then mask_array_rcu_cb() frees old before the swap runs: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in flow_lookup.constprop.0+0x2bf/0x2f0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888020b3e018 by task poc/741 flow_lookup.constprop.0+0x2bf/0x2f0 ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_stats+0x4a3/0x5c0 ovs_dp_process_packet+0x19c/0x710 ovs_vport_receive+0x243/0x390 internal_dev_xmit+0x81/0x170 Freed by task 728: kfree+0x16a/0x4e0 rcu_core+0x853/0x1030 Publish the new array before retiring the old one. The kfree_rcu() that call_rcu() replaced ran after the swap.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/openvswitch/flow_table.c

What this is
OPENVSWITCHMAINTAINERS section matched on net/openvswitch/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
openvswitch

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_OPENVSWITCH /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w openvswitch

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_OPENVSWITCH

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-25 (24 days ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 4.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/openvswitch

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.95.10.2714c98b492e9ed
5.95.15.2224016ead17acd
5.96.1.189017dbbf0d6c3
5.96.6.15876678217cdab
5.96.12.111cd982e11684d
5.96.18.53a0d18d21d48a
5.97.2.7035e9c372206
5.97.3ba4ba11ed6eb

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Both sides of the race are driven locally: tbl_mask_array_realloc() runs from OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW/DEL generic-netlink requests (flow insert/remove growing or shrinking the mask array), and the reader is ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_stats() fed by the attacker's own packets via internal_dev_xmit. No remote protocol carries data that causes the bug.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides, looping flow add/delete to trigger reallocs while transmitting on the datapath's internal port so lookups run. Failed attempts are harmless, the preemptible window can outlast a grace period, and the reporter's KASAN trace shows a PoC hit it.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The OVS datapath, vport and flow genl ops are GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM with netnsok=true, so CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace (unshare -Urn) is enough to create a datapath, add flows and send packets through it.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim action is needed; the attacker creates the datapath, drives mask-array reallocation and generates the lookup traffic entirely by themselves.
S:UScope, unchanged
The impact stays within the kernel's own security authority, as ordinary kernel memory corruption leading to local privilege escalation; no VM or hardware boundary is crossed.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
flow_lookup() reads the freed struct mask_array (max, masks[] pointers) and dereferences masks[i] as sw_flow_mask. If the slab is reclaimed with attacker data, that gives controlled-pointer reads of kernel memory.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
On a flow hit, flow_lookup() does stats->usage_cntrs[index]++ through ma->masks_usage_stats taken from the freed mask_array, so a reclaimed object yields an attacker-steered kernel memory increment (write primitive).
A:HAvailability impact, high
The slab use-after-free in flow_lookup() during ovs_dp_process_packet crashes the kernel (KASAN-reported); with a reclaimed object, wild pointer dereferences cause an oops or panic.