CVE-2026-93231

What the bug is

When releasing locks by server IP address via /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_ip, nlmsvc_unlock_all_by_ip() calls nlm_traverse_files() with the server sockaddr as the opaque @data argument: nlm_traverse_files(server_addr, nlmsvc_match_ip, NULL); The match callback is later invoked from nlm_traverse_locks() as: match(lockhost, host); where the first argument is the nlm_host that owns the lock, and the second argument is the @data that was originally passed down (here the server sockaddr). This is the convention every other match callback relies on (nlmsvc_mark_host(), nlmsvc_same_host(), nlmsvc_is_client()): arg1 is the real nlm_host, arg2 is the caller-supplied reference value. nlmsvc_match_ip() has had these two arguments reversed ever since the unlock-by-IP feature was introduced in commit 4373ea84c84d ("lockd: unlock lockd locks associated with a given server ip"): return rpc_cmp_addr(nlm_srcaddr(host), datap); Here @host is actually the server sockaddr, so nlm_srcaddr(host) dereferences a struct sockaddr as a struct nlm_host and reads garbage at the offset of h_srcaddr; meanwhile @datap is actually the lock owner's nlm_host but is compared as a sockaddr. As a result the comparison practically never matches and locks are not released for the requested IP. Swap the arguments so the lock owner's source address is compared against the requested server address: return rpc_cmp_addr(nlm_srcaddr(datap), (struct sockaddr *)host); [ cel: fix the misleading typedef parameter names too ]

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/lockd/lockd.h
fs/lockd/svcsubs.c

What this is

KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/lockd/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported

Kernel module

lockd

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_LOCKD /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w lockd

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm

m

a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted

Build switch

CONFIG_LOCKD

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-09-24 (24 days ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.17%, higher than 5.6% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

fs/lockd

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
2.6.26	6.12.112	d34c2ac447fe
2.6.26	6.18.51	0d72e78c9d38
2.6.26	7.2.4	21bcb609e0ab
2.6.26	7.3	b9060689f49d

Debian advisories