data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-93121 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-93121

usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix fence cleanup in ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error paths

7.0 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-17 (31 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/usb. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-93121 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The error paths for endpoint-disabled (ESHUTDOWN) and request-allocation failure (ENOMEM) in ffs_dmabuf_transfer() jump to err_fence_put which calls dma_fence_put() on the fence. However, at that point the fence has only been kmalloc'd — dma_fence_init() has not been called yet, so the refcount and the fence ops are uninitialized. Calling dma_fence_put() on such an object leads to undefined behavior. Use kfree() instead, since the fence is just a plain allocation at this stage, and rename the label to err_fence_free to reflect the actual cleanup action.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c

What this is
USB SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/usb/ · linux-usb@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
usb_f_fs

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_OF|CONFIG_PCI|CONFIG_USB|CONFIG_USB_F_FS|CONFIG_USB_GADGET|CONFIG_USB_PHY|CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w usb_f_fs

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, i386/686, i386/686-pae, i386/rt/686-pae, ppc64el/powerpc64le
  • trixieMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, armel/rpi, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, s390x/s390x
  • forky, sidMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, s390x/s390x
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_OF, CONFIG_PCI, CONFIG_USB, CONFIG_USB_F_FS, CONFIG_USB_GADGET, CONFIG_USB_PHY, CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-17 (31 days ago)source
CVSS
7.0 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.15%, higher than 4.2% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/usb

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.96.12.110be539138d9a1
6.96.18.525fd8baacc7dc
6.97.2.658952c83dfe6
6.97.3621707dc67c9

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The uninitialized fence is kmalloc'd and then dma_fence_put() in ffs_dmabuf_transfer(), reached only from ffs_epfile_ioctl()'s FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_TRANSFER case after copy_from_user of usb_ffs_dmabuf_transfer_req; USB host traffic never supplies that ioctl or the fence object.
AC:HAttack complexity, high
err_fence_put runs only when epfile->ep != ep after ffs_epfile_wait_ep() (epfile->ep is NULLed solely by ffs_func_eps_disable() from gadget set_alt/disable/unbind) or when usb_ep_alloc_request(..., GFP_ATOMIC) fails; the ioctl caller cannot invoke those gadget callbacks and cannot reliably force that small GFP_ATOMIC allocation to fail.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
ffs_epfile_ioctl() has no capable() check; FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_TRANSFER only needs the endpoint file open. FunctionFS inodes take uid/gid/mode from ffs_fs_parse_param() (uid=/gid=/fmode=), which deployed gadgets use to hand ep nodes to non-root daemons such as adbd.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker issues FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_TRANSFER themselves on an endpoint fd they already hold; ffs_epfile_wait_ep() needing a prior host SET_CONFIGURATION is ambient gadget enumeration, not a victim action at exploit time.
S:UScope, unchanged
dma_fence_put() on the kmalloc'd ffs_dma_fence runs dma_fence_release() in the same kernel that hosts FunctionFS, so impact stays inside that kernel's privilege boundary rather than crossing a VM or IOMMU authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
kmalloc_obj(*fence) is not zeroed and dma_fence_init() has not run, so fence->refcount and fence->ops are leftover heap contents; dma_fence_put() calls dma_fence_release() if the sprayed refcount is 1, which rcu_dereference()s ops and reads other fence fields.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
dma_fence_release() calls ops->release() through the uninitialized fence->ops pointer (or walks garbage cb_list in the pending-signal path); a same-cache heap spray can point ops at attacker-controlled function pointers for control-flow hijack.
A:HAvailability impact, high
dma_fence_release() does list_empty(&fence->cb_list) and dma_fence_lock_irqsave() on uninitialized cb_list/lock and may invoke a wild ops->release(), any of which oopses or panics when the ESHUTDOWN or ENOMEM err_fence_put path runs.