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CVE-2026-93116
platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure
Published 2026-09-17 (31 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/platform. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-93116 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | vulnerable | 6.12.113-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
During driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are registered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order relative to the registration sequence. Specifically: 1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs, it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups, which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources. 2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad. Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources. Fix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in asus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource allocations.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c
- What this is
- ASUS NOTEBOOKS AND EEEPC ACPI/WMI EXTRAS DRIVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/platform/x86/asus*.c · platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- asus_wmi
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_ASUS_WMI|CONFIG_X86' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w asus_wmiPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le
- trixieMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt-arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_ASUS_WMI, CONFIG_X86
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-17 (31 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.0 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.16%, higher than 5.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/platform
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.17 | 6.18.57 | 8410cd2690d4 |
| 5.17 | 7.2.6 | 3308b8c5f5a2 |
| 5.17 | 7.3 | ef3daa2b84a2 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The leak is created in asus_wmi_add() called from asus_wmi_probe() during asus_wmi_register_driver()'s platform_create_bundle() for asus-nb-wmi/eeepc-wmi module init; leftover rfkill objects are later driven via /dev/rfkill (rfkill_fop_write), not by a network or radio protocol message.
- AC:HAttack complexity, high
- The dangling asus_rfkill exists only when asus_screenpad_init() returns an error other than -ENODEV after asus_wmi_rfkill_init() has registered devices, which requires an ACPI WMI failure from asus_wmi_get_devstate()/asus_wmi_evaluate_method() or backlight_device_register() failure that the attacker cannot induce.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- After fail_screenpad skips asus_wmi_rfkill_exit(), the leaked rfkill stays on rfkill_list; rfkill_fop_write() has no capable() check, so a local session user who can open /dev/rfkill (typical laptop rfkill group/uaccess) can send RFKILL_OP_CHANGE and reach asus_rfkill_set() without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker themselves writes RFKILL_OP_CHANGE/CHANGE_ALL to /dev/rfkill targeting the leaked asus-wlan/asus-bluetooth rfkill idx; no other user must mount media, plug a device, or confirm a prompt.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- kfree(asus) on the asus_wmi_add() fail_screenpad path and the later asus_rfkill_query()/asus_rfkill_set() dereference of priv->asus occur in the host kernel; this is not a KVM/Xen guest escape or IOMMU/DMA bypass.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- fail_screenpad jumps past asus_wmi_rfkill_exit() and then kfree(asus) while rfkill->data still points at the embedded struct asus_rfkill; rfkill_set_block() calls asus_rfkill_query(), which reads priv->asus and priv->dev_id from that freed object, a kernel UAF read.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The same dangling rfkill->data is passed to asus_rfkill_set()/asus_rfkill_wlan_set(), which use priv->asus->driver and mutex_lock(&asus->wmi_lock); the leaked backlight_device also keeps bl_get_data()==asus for update_bl_status(), so reclaiming the freed asus_wmi object is a write/control-flow primitive.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- asus_rfkill_query() and asus_rfkill_set() dereference the kfree'd struct asus_wmi, and asus_rfkill_wlan_set() takes asus->wmi_lock in freed memory, which oopses; fail_custom_fan_curve also skips asus_wmi_input_exit(), leaving a registered input_dev until reboot.