CVE-2026-90251

What the bug is

read_supported_features() only checks that the response covers the fixed part of struct msft_rp_read_supported_features, which is 11 bytes: if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "MSFT supported features length mismatch"); goto failed; } evt_prefix[] is a flexible array member and rp->evt_prefix_len is an unvalidated u8 taken straight out of that response, so msft->evt_prefix = kmemdup(rp->evt_prefix, rp->evt_prefix_len, GFP_KERNEL); copies up to 255 bytes from a reply that may have carried none of them. What is copied is data the controller never sent, and it is then used to match incoming vendor events in msft_vendor_evt(). This is not an out-of-bounds access. An skb data allocation always has at least SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) bytes past the payload, which is more than the 255 byte maximum, so the read stays inside the allocation and KASAN does not report it. It is still a read of bytes the host was never given, with the length fully controlled by the controller. Reject a response that is too short for the prefix it declares. Verified with an emulated controller over /dev/vhci on a KASAN kernel, with vhci made to advertise an MSFT opcode the way btintel, btqca, btmtk and btrtl do unconditionally. A reply of exactly 11 bytes declaring evt_prefix_len = 255 reaches kmemdup and copies 255 bytes ("skb->len=11 evt_prefix_len=255", with the copied buffer dumped); since the reply ends at the fixed part, all 255 come from past the end of the response. No KASAN report is produced, as expected from the allocation slack described above. With this patch the response is rejected with "MSFT event prefix length mismatch" and msft->evt_prefix is left unset.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/bluetooth/msft.c

What this is

BLUETOOTH SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on net/bluetooth/ · linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org · Supported

Kernel module

none to look for. The file would have gone into bluetooth, and Debian does not compile it into that module, so finding bluetooth in lsmod would say nothing about this CVE.

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BT|CONFIG_BT_MSFTEXT' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian does not build this code. In 5 releases below, every kernel flavour Debian publishes has the switch off, so the vulnerable file is compiled into no kernel binary Debian ships.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12n

n

not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code

Build switches

CONFIG_BT, CONFIG_BT_MSFTEXT

Reads as

all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-09-17 (31 days ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.21%, higher than 10.5% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

net/bluetooth

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
5.8	5.10.270	dce783a10e70
5.8	5.15.221	21f539c59ed3
5.8	6.1.188	52b1b3b4d403
5.8	6.6.157	e804d54a5a99
5.8	6.12.110	620c2631cff4
5.8	6.18.52	7c2658023d83
5.8	7.2.6	63562cfaea8a
5.8	7.3	0079e1a94463

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