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CVE-2026-90217

bpf: Compare iterator types during state pruning

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-17 (31 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem kernel/bpf. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-90217 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

An iterator stack slot can be MEM_RCU or PTR_UNTRUSTED. These states must not be equal, or the verifier can prune an unsafe path. Compare the pointer type for STACK_ITER slots.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

kernel/bpf/states.c

What this is
BPF [GENERAL] (Safe Dynamic Programs and Tools)MAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/bpf/ · bpf@vger.kernel.org · Supported

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BPF|CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release with an answer below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships. The build rule could not be established for 2 releases, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm, trixie?
  • forky, sidy
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switches
CONFIG_BPF, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-17 (31 days ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
kernel/bpf

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.76.18.57e4ab436d5ba6
6.77.2.66424b9cde9ed
6.77.383608e303b95

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The attacker-controlled input is the BPF instruction stream copied in bpf_prog_load() from bpf(2) BPF_PROG_LOAD (__sys_bpf). bpf_check() then stacksafe() treats STACK_ITER slots with MEM_RCU and PTR_UNTRUSTED as equal; that bytecode is local syscall input, not a remote protocol payload.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker authors both verifier paths as in iter_tasks_rcu_state_pruning: bpf_iter_task_new under bpf_rcu_read_lock, then a bpf_get_prandom_u32 branch that nested-lock/unlock (MEM_RCU) or unlock/relock (PTR_UNTRUSTED) before bpf_iter_task_next. Both sides and the branch are attacker-controlled; no victim timing is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
add_subprog_and_kfunc() rejects kfunc calls unless env->bpf_capable. bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new are kfuncs; BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL (always sleepable) needs only bpf_token_capable(CAP_BPF). bpf_token_capable() uses ns_capable() on a delegated token userns, so this is not init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker loads the crafted sleepable program with BPF_PROG_LOAD and executes it via BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN (bpf_prog_test_run_syscall) or by attaching their own fentry.s; no other user must mount a filesystem, open a file, or cooperate.
S:UScope, unchanged
A pruned bpf_iter_task_next() walks host task_struct lists in the same kernel that loaded the program. That is in-kernel use-after-free and privilege escalation, not a KVM/Xen guest-to-host escape or IOMMU bypass.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
After the pruned unlock/relock gap, bpf_iter_task_next() returns kit->pos from bpf_iter_task_kern, a task_struct * that may already have been RCU-freed. The program can read BTF fields of that dangling pointer, so the UAF is an arbitrary kernel disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
bpf_iter_task_next() then calls next_task()/__next_thread() (list_entry_rcu on tasks.next and thread_node) using the dangling kit->pos. Walking attacker-reclaimed task_struct list nodes is a kernel write primitive; UAF and iterator type confusion are Integrity High.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Using the untrusted STACK_ITER after the RCU gap makes next_task() or css_next_descendant_*() dereference a freed task_struct or cgroup_subsys_state, causing a kernel oops or panic even when the UAF is not fully exploited.