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CVE-2026-90177

bpf: Check pointer type for all atomic RMW paths

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-17 (31 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem kernel/bpf. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-90177 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Atomic RMW verification records an instruction pointer type only when the current destination is PTR_TO_ARENA. A second path can therefore reach the same instruction with an ordinary pointer without comparing it against the saved arena type. The post-verification fixup uses the saved type to rewrite the instruction to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC for every path. Record the actual destination type for all atomic RMW paths so the existing mismatch check rejects incompatible uses of one instruction.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

What this is
BPF [CORE]MAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/bpf/verifier.c · bpf@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BPF|CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switches
CONFIG_BPF, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-17 (31 days ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
kernel/bpf

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.106.18.57d4ba9d888ac0
6.107.2.6eb287c6e81de
6.107.34bc49ae344d6

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The attacker-controlled input is the BPF instruction stream copied in bpf_prog_load() from bpf(2) BPF_PROG_LOAD (__sys_bpf). do_check_insn() then check_atomic() then check_atomic_rmw() sees a mixed PTR_TO_ARENA versus kernel-pointer atomic; that bytecode is local syscall input, not a remote protocol payload.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker authors both verifier paths: one branch with a PTR_TO_ARENA destination and another with PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_STACK at the same BPF_ATOMIC RMW. check_atomic_rmw() records only the arena type, bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites it to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC, and bpf_prog_test_run_syscall() takes the non-arena path on demand.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The mixed path needs a BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA map; check_map_prog_compatibility() rejects that unless env->bpf_capable and env->allow_ptr_leaks (bpf_token_capable(CAP_BPF) and bpf_token_capable(CAP_PERFMON)). bpf_token_capable() uses ns_capable() on a delegated token userns, so this is not init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker creates the arena with BPF_MAP_CREATE, loads the mixed-path program with BPF_PROG_LOAD, and executes it via bpf_prog_test_run() to bpf_prog_test_run_syscall(); no other user must mount, open a file, or otherwise cooperate.
S:UScope, unchanged
The confused BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC is JITed as emit_atomic_rmw_index() adding arena kern_vm_start (R12) onto a kernel map or stack pointer and runs in the host kernel; that is host memory corruption, not a KVM/Xen guest-to-host escape or IOMMU bypass.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
After bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites the shared RMW to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC, the non-arena path executes lock xchg/cmpxchg/fetch-add at (PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or PTR_TO_STACK + bpf_arena_get_kern_vm_start()). BPF_FETCH, XCHG, and CMPXCHG return the old value from that address, an arbitrary kernel read.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same instruction performs an attacker-chosen atomic RMW (BPF_ADD/AND/OR/XOR/XCHG/CMPXCHG in check_atomic_rmw) at kernel_ptr+kern_vm_start. With CONFIG_VMAP_STACK or a vmalloc map, that sum is a canonical direct-map address, giving a kernel write primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
An atomic RMW into the direct map corrupts live kernel state and can panic; a non-canonical or unmapped sum that a JIT does not cover with an exception table oopses. Type-confused kernel atomics are Availability High.