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CVE-2026-90042
ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers
Published 2026-09-16 (33 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/ceph. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-90042 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However, the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages, which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc(). The various callers of ceph_fname_to_usr() directly pass (slices of) raw messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms (see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer). Make ceph_fname_to_usr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using `tname` (which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any inappropriate addresses to fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(). Additionally change parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only function to supply its own `tname` -- to follow the new "tname must never come from vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce buffer in parse_reply_info_readdir() and use that as `tname` instead.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/ceph/crypto.c
fs/ceph/mds_client.c
- What this is
- CEPH DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CEPH)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/ceph/ · ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- ceph
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_CEPH_FS|CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w cephPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_CEPH_FS, CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-16 (33 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.50%, higher than 41.6% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- fs/ceph
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.6 | 6.12.111 | 93729594af50 |
| 6.6 | 6.18.51 | 110747ff535e |
| 6.6 | 7.2.5 | 3b467c68803d |
| 6.6 | 7.3 | e939fc6a7bd9 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- ceph_fname_to_usr() runs while parsing CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY on the kernel CephFS client TCP session (mds_dispatch → handle_reply → parse_reply_info_readdir/fill_trace); a malicious or compromised MDS delivers the kvmalloc'd filename buffers that are passed into fscrypt.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The MDS fully controls hdr.front_len (up to CEPH_MSG_MAX_FRONT_LEN, 16MB). kvmalloc() of that size skips costly kmalloc reclaim and falls back to vmalloc deterministically, so sg_init_one() on the message names does not depend on incidental fragmentation or a race.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The attacker is the remote MDS peer on an already-connected kernel CephFS client and needs no Linux UID, capability, or init-namespace root on the victim, matching other MDS-driven client CVEs such as CVE-2026-89651.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Once encrypted CephFS is mounted with keys loaded (standard in Rook/Kubernetes/OpenStack, including NFS re-export LOOKUPNAME), readdir and lookup replies are processed automatically in the ceph-msgr path with no further victim mount or interactive step at exploit time.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Wrong-page scatterlist crypto and any resulting kernel memory corruption stay inside the victim host's CephFS client and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox security boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- fname_decrypt() builds src_sg with sg_set_buf()/virt_to_page() on the vmalloc MDS buffer, so skcipher decryption reads unintended kernel pages as ciphertext; that memory-corruption read is High per kernel UAF/wrong-page guidance.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- parse_reply_info_readdir() decrypts filenames in place, so dst_sg also aliases the vmalloc message; crypto_skcipher_decrypt() then writes plaintext through virt_to_page() of a non-linear address, a wrong-page kernel write scored High.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Passing vmalloc addresses into the scatterlist crypto API oopses or panics, especially on non-x86 where virt_to_page() of a non-linear address faults in scatterwalk, and a malicious MDS can repeat this on every encrypted readdir reply.