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CVE-2026-90000
HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports
Published 2026-09-16 (33 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/hid. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-90000 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text | 6.1.190-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound: data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report); data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report); alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size; data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size; but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a 1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2 for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of. The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at &readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes reads out of bounds even when it answers truthfully. Those bytes become the register values the RMI core acts on: rmi_f01_probe() prints them to the kernel log as the product id and exports them through the mode 0444 sysfs attribute of the same name, and rmi_driver_set_irq_bits() sends them back to the device as the interrupt mask, so an undersized report descriptor leaks heap contents both to unprivileged userspace and to the device itself. The write path has no bound either: rmi_hid_write_block() copies an unbounded len to &writeReport[4], and the largest caller a device can drive at probe time is rmi_driver_set_irq_bits(), whose length is derived from the interrupt source counts the device declares in its Page Description Table. Finally, the read loop cannot terminate on a zero-length reply: such a reply copies nothing and advances neither bytes_read nor bytes_needed, and because a reply did arrive the one second wait_event_timeout() does not fire either, so a device answering 0 forever keeps the loop running inside the probe worker with page_mutex held. khungtaskd does not notice, because every reply wakes the task. Reject reports too small for what the driver builds -- 6 output bytes for the write reports and 3 input bytes for the read handshake -- at probe time, clamp the write and the read copy to the report sizes the device declared, and treat a zero-length reply as an error. A device refused this way is started as an ordinary HID device, like one that does not carry the RMI report ids at all. RMI_DEVICE must not be left set in device_flags on that path, because rmi_input_configured() would then run the RMI setup and reach rmi_set_page(), which writes the writeReport buffer the refusal just skipped allocating. The bit can arrive set: rmi_probe() copies id->driver_data into device_flags before the report checks, and a bind through the new_id sysfs attribute can supply driver_data with RMI_DEVICE (BIT(0)) set. Strip the bit where driver_data is copied, so RMI_DEVICE keeps meaning exactly "this probe validated the reports"; the three jumps to start that predate this patch are covered as well. The error path also clears RMI_READ_DATA_PENDING on its way out, because that flag is what the wait at the top of the loop tests: leaving it set would make every later wait_event_timeout() return immediately on the stale reply and kill the read path for the rest of the device's life. Clamping does not regress working hardware: the read loop already handles ---truncated---
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c
- What this is
- HID CORE LAYERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/hid/ · linux-input@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- hid_rmi
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_HID|CONFIG_HID_RMI|CONFIG_HID_SUPPORT' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w hid_rmiPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_HID, CONFIG_HID_RMI, CONFIG_HID_SUPPORT
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-16 (33 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- adjacent network (AV:A)source
- EPSS
- 0.35%, higher than 27.0% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/hid
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 3.16 | 5.10.270 | fba600d82459 |
| 3.16 | 5.15.221 | 056ef8e6700b |
| 3.16 | 6.1.188 | 183da103022e |
| 3.16 | 6.6.157 | a8be8bbf0952 |
| 3.16 | 6.12.110 | ab2958e0c94e |
| 3.16 | 6.18.51 | f4cb9c4556dc |
| 3.16 | 7.2.5 | 48934c292741 |
| 3.16 | 7.3 | 4956993bb3be |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4841-1 | 2026-10-17 | bookworm 6.1.190-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:AAttack vector, adjacent network
- hid-rmi matches HID_DEVICE(HID_BUS_ANY, HID_GROUP_RMI, HID_ANY_ID, HID_ANY_ID), so a Bluetooth HID/HoGP peripheral claiming Synaptics VID 0x06cb and an RMI-style descriptor is grouped HID_GROUP_RMI and bound over an adjacent wireless link; USB attach is only a lower-severity physical path.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker fully controls the HID report descriptor (undersized input/output reports) and RMI reply bytes, including the read-length byte and PDT interrupt-source counts, so probe performs the OOB read/write and optional zero-length hang with no race or other condition outside attacker control.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- A malicious HID peripheral is sufficient: hid-rmi autoloads and rmi_input_configured()/rmi_f01_probe() run during enumeration, with no local account, capability, or init-namespace privilege required on the victim.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- rmi_set_page() and rmi_hid_read_block() run from rmi_input_configured() during hid_hw_start() as soon as the device connects or auto-reconnects; no extra victim open, mount, or confirmation is required.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The heap out-of-bounds read and write corrupt host kernel memory in the HID/RMI probe path and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security authority.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- rmi_hid_read_block() copies from &readReport[2] using a device-supplied length of up to 255 bytes with no input_report_size bound, reading adjacent slab into RMI registers that are logged and exported via the world-readable product_id sysfs attribute; heap OOB reads are High confidentiality.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Undersized output reports make rmi_set_page() and rmi_hid_read_block() store past writeReport, and rmi_hid_write_block() memcpy's an unbounded PDT-derived length to &writeReport[4], overflowing the heap allocation; out-of-bounds writes are High integrity.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The heap OOB access causes a kernel oops (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in rmi_hid_read_block/rmi_hid_write_block), and a device answering zero-length read replies loops forever in probe with page_mutex held, hanging a kworker; kernel crash or hang is High availability.