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CVE-2026-89916
KVM: arm64: Make VNCR invalidation participate in MMU invalidation retry
Published 2026-09-16 (33 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem arch/arm64. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89916 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
A VNCR TLB invalidation can occur on one vcpu while another vcpu is faulting in this same page. Without correctly handling this, we can end up with the following scenario: - vcpu A walks the PTs to translate VNCR - before vcpu A is able to grab the MMU lock to insert the TLB, vcpu B updates the S1 PTs with an invalid entry, and issues a TLBI S1E2 for this VA - vcpu A inserts the TLB for something that is now invalid This isn't a new problem, and we manage S2 by having the MMU notifier to bump up mmu_invalidate_seq on invalidation so that the fault can be replayed. We can perform something similar here, and extend invalidate_vncr_va() to update the same counter, clearly indicating that the context has changed under our feet. This is safe as the invalidation always happen while holding the MMU lock for write, and that we sample the sequence number before walking S1.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
- What this is
- KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)MAINTAINERS section matched on arch/arm64/kvm/ · linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- kvm
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_KVM /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w kvmPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm?
- trixieBnot built on armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp
- forky, sidBnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- B
- built in on some, a module on others, absent on the rest
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switch
- CONFIG_KVM
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-16 (33 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.3 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.19%, higher than 8.4% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- arch/arm64
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.16 | 6.18.51 | d8580e7aa189 |
| 6.16 | 7.2.5 | 11ee3faab4f1 |
| 6.16 | 7.3 | 2b7324f3a0c1 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- An arm64 nested L1 hypervisor reaches the bug via KVM_RUN: a VNCR data abort (kvm_handle_vncr_abort → kvm_translate_vncr) races a trapped EL2 TLBI (handle_tlbi_el2 → kvm_handle_s1e2_tlbi → invalidate_vncr_va). This is local KVM ioctl/guest execution, not a network, adjacent-radio, or physical path.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker owns both vCPUs of the same VM: one walks EL2 stage-1 for VNCR while another updates those S1 page tables and issues TLBI S1E2. A race the attacker drives on both sides is AC:L, and nested virt on NV-capable arm64 hosts is an attacker-selectable deployment.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- Exploitation requires no host root or init-namespace capabilities beyond running hypervisor code in a tenant KVM guest on an arm64 host with nested virtualization enabled; the attacker operates entirely from within their assigned VM, consistent with other arm64 KVM nested-virt CVE scoring.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim user or administrator action is required beyond the attacker operating their own nested-virtualization workload; VNCR faults, S1 page-table updates, and TLBI S1E2 on a second vCPU are fully attacker-driven.
- S:CScope, changed
- The stale VNCR pseudo-TLB is installed in host KVM and mapped into the host per-CPU fixmap via __set_fixmap, so a guest-controlled walk/TLBI race corrupts host nested-MMU state and can retain a writable kernel mapping of a revoked PFN, crossing the guest-to-hypervisor security boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- kvm_translate_vncr() stores a raw HPA and drops the page pin via kvm_release_faultin_page(). A walk that misses S1 TLBI retry still maps that HPA PAGE_KERNEL in the host VNCR fixmap, so NV2/sysreg emulation can read pages the guest has invalidated and the host may have reused, which is UAF-class disclosure.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The same stale vncr_tlb is remapped writable (PAGE_KERNEL) in the host fixmap, so nested EL2 register writes and NV2 stores land in the old HPA after the guest's TLBI/BBM sequence. That is a host-kernel write to memory whose translation was revoked and may have been reused.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Using a stale HPA through the host VNCR fixmap can oops or panic the host if the PFN was unmapped or recycled, and corrupting nested EL2 control state or reused host pages can hang or crash the hypervisor and co-resident VMs; the attacker can retrigger the walk/TLBI race.