CVE-2026-89846

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network

qla2xxx builds initiator status IOCBs from a remote Fibre Channel or FCoE target's FCP_RSP; QLogic CNAs speak FCoE and SAN fabrics are stretched across sites via FCIP/inter-fabric routing, so a malicious or compromised target delivers the crafted rsp_data_len over the storage network with no local access.

AC:LAttack complexity, low

A hostile target fully controls FCP_RSP (SS_RESPONSE_INFO_LEN_VALID, rsp_data_len, sense_len, CHECK CONDITION, rsp_info[3]==0) and can return them on ordinary initiator I/O such as INQUIRY during fabric scan; no race, rare config, or victim state beyond a FWI2-capable HBA is required.

PR:NPrivileges required, none

Completions are handled in the HBA interrupt/response-queue path (qla24xx_process_response_queue to qla2x00_status_entry) with no Linux credential or capability check; the attacker only needs to act as an FC/FCoE target on the fabric.

UI:NUser interaction, none

Once the target is visible on the fabric, the SCSI midlayer automatically issues commands (scan, path checks, mounted-filesystem I/O) whose STATUS_TYPE completions take the vulnerable path; no user mount, open, or other interactive step is required at exploit time.

S:UScope, unchanged

The out-of-bounds read and any resulting oops stay inside the host kernel that owns the qla2xxx driver and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security authority.

C:HConfidentiality impact, high

Attacker-controlled 32-bit rsp_info_len advances sense_data out of the 28-byte IOCB data area and underflows par_sense_len so qla2x00_handle_sense() copies up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE (96) bytes of adjacent response-ring or kernel memory into the command sense buffer, which userspace can read via SCSI completion, SG_IO, and BSG.

I:NIntegrity impact, none

The memcpy destination is the in-bounds SCSI sense buffer already capped at SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE; this is a source over-read only, with no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or control-flow hijack primitive.

A:HAvailability impact, high

Adding a 32-bit attacker-chosen rsp_info_len to sense_data yields a wild kernel pointer; memcpy from an unmapped address in the interrupt-context response-queue path oopses or panics the host, and the target can repeat this on every command.