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CVE-2026-89777

vfio/pci: clear vdev->msi_perm after freeing it on init failure

8.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-16 (33 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/vfio. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89777 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table: vdev->msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!vdev->msi_perm) return -ENOMEM; ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev->msi_perm, len, flags); if (ret) { kfree(vdev->msi_perm); return ret; /* vdev->msi_perm left dangling */ } When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -> alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the error path frees vdev->msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in it. vdev->msi_perm is not re-zeroed later because struct vfio_pci_core_device is per-device and persists across open/close cycles, and the vfio_config_init() error path returns without calling vfio_config_free(). So the dangling pointer outlives the failed open. That leads to two use-after-frees on the same device: 1. Reuse. The next vfio_config_init() sees the stale pointer at "if (vdev->msi_perm) return len;" and reuses the freed object. MSI config accesses in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() then dereference and call the freed perm->readfn / perm->writefn function pointers. 2. Double free. A later vfio_config_free() runs free_perm_bits() and kfree() on the already-freed object. Fix it by NULLing vdev->msi_perm after the kfree(), matching the NULL-after-free discipline already used in free_perm_bits() and vfio_config_free(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vfio_pci_config_rw_single (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1961) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800fcc88d0 by task exploit/143 Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) vfio_pci_config_rw_single (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1961) vfio_pci_config_rw (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1986) vfio_pci_rw (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c:1599) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) __x64_sys_pread64 (fs/read_write.c:764) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ... Followed on device close by a double free of the same object: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x1f63e0e8000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:kfree (mm/slub.c:6711) Call Trace: vfio_config_free (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1861) vfio_pci_core_disable (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c:685) vfio_pci_core_close_device (drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c:777) vfio_df_close (drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c:602) vfio_device_fops_release (drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c:648) __fput (fs/file_table.c:512) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1496) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c

What this is
VFIO DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/vfio/ · kvm@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
vfio_pci_core

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_VFIO|CONFIG_VFIO_PCI|CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_CORE' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w vfio_pci_core

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp
  • trixieMnot built on armel/rpi
  • forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switches
CONFIG_VFIO, CONFIG_VFIO_PCI, CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_CORE
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-16 (33 days ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 5.2% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/vfio

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.205.10.270eb84cd81040e
4.205.15.221f0eea8f90136
4.206.1.188d665a1688af7
4.206.6.15725cdd2a492d8
4.206.12.110812f1db7f075
4.206.18.52533d0c5feef8
4.207.2.6fda8fb7e8179
4.207.3dc77acfeb979
4.4.20300
4.9.20300
4.14.15500
4.19.8500

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The UAF is reached only via local VFIO char-device operations: open of /dev/vfio/$GROUP or /dev/vfio/devices/vfioN, then pread/pwrite of the PCI config region through vfio_pci_core_read/write into vfio_pci_config_rw_single(). There is no network or packet path into vfio_msi_cap_len().
AC:LAttack complexity, low
After any failed vfio_config_init() plants the dangling vdev->msi_perm, the attacker retries GET_DEVICE_FD/BIND_IOMMUFD on the same persistent vdev and deterministically calls the freed perm->readfn/writefn via MSI config accesses. The attacker controls that open/read sequence; no victim race or uncontrolled layout is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
vfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_config_rw() have no capable() check on the normal IOMMU path (CAP_SYS_RAWIO is only for noiommu). Access is gated by /dev/vfio node permissions, which libvirt, kubevirt, and cloud GPU/NIC passthrough routinely grant to an unprivileged qemu user or tenant.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker performs the VFIO open, retry, and MSI config-space pread/pwrite themselves. Prior admin binding of the PCI device to vfio-pci is deployment configuration, not victim interaction during exploitation.
S:CScope, changed
struct vfio_pci_core_device persists across open/close, so a failed open can leave a dangling msi_perm that a later tenant VM reuses. QEMU services guest PCI config cycles with VFIO pread/pwrite, so a passthrough guest can invoke the freed host function pointers and cross the VFIO/IOMMU guest-to-host boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The next successful open reuses the freed perm_bits and MSI config reads call perm->readfn on that object. Reclaiming the slab slot yields an arbitrary kernel-read primitive, which CVSS kernel guidance scores High for use-after-free.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
MSI config writes call the freed perm->writefn, and a later close double-frees the same object in vfio_config_free(). That UAF/double-free of a structure with function pointers is exploitable for arbitrary kernel write and control-flow hijack.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The report shows a KASAN slab-use-after-free in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() followed by a general-protection fault in kfree() during vfio_config_free() that panics the host, so availability impact is a kernel oops/panic.