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CVE-2026-89743
misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/misc. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89743 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/misc/nsm.c
- What this is
- NITRO SECURE MODULE (NSM)MAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/misc/nsm.c · linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- nsm
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_NSM /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w nsmPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm?
- trixieMnot built on armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- forky, sidMnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switch
- CONFIG_NSM
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.7 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.14%, higher than 3.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/misc
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.8 | 6.12.109 | 339f19b9a617 |
| 6.8 | 6.18.50 | 29e634a18957 |
| 6.8 | 7.2.4 | 2aa0fb9c96f8 |
| 6.8 | 7.3 | 808e530654a5 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- A malicious or buggy virtio-nsm backend (hypervisor, QEMU virtio-nsm, or vhost-user device) over-reports the used-ring length consumed by nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked(); the path is local ioctl on /dev/nsm plus virtio, not a network protocol.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The backend deterministically sets the 32-bit used-ring length on each completion, and a local NSM_IOCTL_RAW caller supplies the response iovec that parse_resp_raw() uses as the other copy bound; no race or attacker-uncontrollable layout is required.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The driver registers /dev/nsm as mode 0666 and nsm_dev_ioctl() has no capable() check, so any local process can issue NSM_IOCTL_RAW; a malicious virtio backend also needs no guest credentials.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker opens /dev/nsm and issues NSM_IOCTL_RAW from their own process (the ioctl does not cap response.len to NSM_RESPONSE_MAX_SIZE); no separate victim must mount, click, or otherwise interact.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The out-of-bounds read and any resulting oops occur in the guest kernel that hosts the NSM frontend; this is device-to-guest impact, not a guest-to-host, IOMMU, or cross-VM escape.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- parse_resp_raw() copy_to_user() copies min(user_len, unbounded device len) from the 0x3000-byte resp->data array, so an over-reported length reads adjacent kmalloc heap and returns that kernel memory to userspace.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The oversized copy writes only into the ioctl caller's userspace buffer; kernel memory is only read, with no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or control-flow hijack primitive.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- A device-chosen length up to 4GiB drives copy_to_user() past the nsm slab object into unmapped or guarded memory, causing a guest kernel oops or panic that can be repeated on every NSM request.