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CVE-2026-89707
nfsd: release path refs on follow_down() error
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/nfsd. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89707 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
nfsd_cross_mnt() initializes a local struct path with mntget() and dget() before calling follow_down(). On a negative return the error arm jumps to out without releasing those references: err = follow_down(&path, follow_flags); if (err < 0) goto out; follow_down() never drops the caller's entry-time refs on any error sub-case; for example a pre-cross d_manage() failure leaves path untouched, so the mntget()/dget() taken on entry survive the call. Every other early-exit arm in nfsd_cross_mnt() (other-namespace return, IS_ERR(exp2), and the success tail after the swap) already calls path_put(&path); the err < 0 arm is the lone omission. The leak inflates mnt_count and d_count on each failed cross-mount, blocking umount and pinning dentries against the shrinker, and is reachable by any authenticated NFS client through nfsd_lookup_dentry or the NFSv4 READDIR encode path. Fix by calling path_put(&path) before the goto out in the err < 0 arm so the entry-time refs are released on all follow_down() error returns.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/nfsd/vfs.c
- What this is
- KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/nfsd/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- nfsd
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_NFSD /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w nfsdPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switch
- CONFIG_NFSD
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.61%, higher than 48.2% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- fs/nfsd
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.38 | 6.6.157 | 085cfde7c218 |
| 2.6.38 | 6.12.109 | 194316df8126 |
| 2.6.38 | 6.18.50 | 467d56fd3ff5 |
| 2.6.38 | 7.2.4 | 2bc4343308d8 |
| 2.6.38 | 7.3 | 6cba08dc1922 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- nfsd_cross_mnt() runs in the in-kernel NFS server on TCP/UDP 2049 from nfsd_lookup_dentry() (NFSv2/v3/v4 LOOKUP) and nfsd4_encode_entry4_fattr() (NFSv4 READDIR); a remote client reaches it with ordinary RPC requests.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- On a typical nfsd export of autofs homes or nested mounts with crossmnt, an attacker can deterministically make follow_down() fail (autofs d_manage/automount error) by repeating LOOKUP/READDIR of failing mount triggers; no race or victim-controlled layout is required.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- Default nfsd exports accept RPC_AUTH_NULL and RPC_AUTH_UNIX with no password; fh_verify only checks export IP policy, a MOUNT/PUTROOTFH filehandle, and directory execute, so no Linux account or capability on the server is required.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker triggers the leak with their own NFS LOOKUP or READDIR RPCs; no victim mount, click, or other interactive action is required.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The leak inflates dentry and vfsmount refcounts inside the nfsd host kernel and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security authority.
- C:NConfidentiality impact, none
- The bug only fails to path_put() the mntget/dget taken before follow_down(); it does not read kernel or file data or provide an information-disclosure primitive.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The bug does not write attacker-controlled data or corrupt kernel objects; it only retains extra references on existing dentries and mounts.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Each failed follow_down() permanently pins the dentry and vfsmount; repeated LOOKUPs of distinct autofs/mountpoint names leave unreclaimable dentries, block umount, and can exhaust kernel memory for a system-wide DoS.