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CVE-2026-89672
nfsd: gate nfs2 setacl by argp->mask
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/nfsd. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
Debian does not build this code. The per-release build detail is under "Where it lives" below.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89672 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
The NFSACL v2 SETACL path shares the decoder convention used by its v3 sibling: nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() fills in argp->acl_access only when NFS_ACL is set in the request mask and argp->acl_default only when NFS_DFACL is set, leaving the other pointer NULL because the argument buffer is zeroed up to pc_argzero before decode. nfsacld_proc_setacl() then hands both pointers to set_posix_acl() unconditionally. set_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS "remove this ACL type" operation, so an omitted arm is indistinguishable from an explicit request to delete that ACL. A SETACL carrying only NFS_ACL silently strips the directory's default ACL; mask=0 strips both. This is the same defect just fixed in nfsd3_proc_setacl(); apply the same remedy. Gate each set_posix_acl() call on its mask bit and initialize error to 0 so that a request with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and returns success. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional posix_acl_release() in nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() already tolerate the skipped arms.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
- What this is
- KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/nfsd/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- none to look for. The file would have gone into nfsd, and Debian does not compile it into that module, so finding nfsd in lsmod would say nothing about this CVE.
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_NFSD|CONFIG_NFSD_V2_ACL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian does not build this code. In 5 releases below, every kernel flavour Debian publishes has the switch off, so the vulnerable file is compiled into no kernel binary Debian ships.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12n
- n
- not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code
- Build switches
- CONFIG_NFSD, CONFIG_NFSD_V2_ACL
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.1 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.52%, higher than 43.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- fs/nfsd
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.13 | 6.6.157 | 8e4422b05f41 |
| 2.6.13 | 6.12.109 | e41d173d9dc7 |
| 2.6.13 | 6.18.50 | f951b22dbeec |
| 2.6.13 | 7.2.4 | 37eea38e7898 |
| 2.6.13 | 7.3 | a3a7e20ed66d |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- The flaw is in nfsd NFSACL v2 SETACL (RPC program 100227, ACLPROC2_SETACL) in nfsacld_proc_setacl(); a remote NFS client reaches it over TCP/UDP 2049 via svc_process to nfsd_dispatch and nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker supplies the SETACL mask and filehandle. A request with only NFS_ACL, only NFS_DFACL, or mask=0 leaves the omitted posix_acl pointer NULL (pc_argzero), and set_posix_acl() treats NULL as delete with no race or uninfluencable victim state.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- Typical AUTH_SYS nfsd exports do not cryptographically verify RPC credentials; any host allowed by the export can MOUNT/LOOKUP and send SETACL with a spoofed AUTH_UNIX owner uid so nfsd_setuser() and inode_owner_or_capable() succeed without a local account.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacking NFS client sends the SETACL RPC itself; no local user or administrator action on the NFS server, such as mounting a filesystem or opening a file, is required at attack time.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Unintended set_posix_acl(NULL) only removes POSIX ACL xattrs on the exported filesystem of the nfsd host; impact stays in that kernel/filesystem security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Silently deleting a directory default ACL (SETACL with only NFS_ACL, or mask=0 stripping both) drops inheritance so new files are governed only by mode/umask, allowing a remote client to READ subsequently created data those default ACLs were meant to keep confidential.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- nfsacld_proc_setacl() calls set_posix_acl(..., NULL) for every ACL type omitted from the mask, which is the VFS delete operation, so an attacker-chosen inode can have its access ACL, default ACL, or both completely removed and later writes those ACLs would have denied.
- A:NAvailability impact, none
- This is an unintended POSIX ACL deletion through the normal set_posix_acl(NULL) remove path; it does not oops, panic, hang, deadlock, or leak memory, so the NFS server and host remain available.