CVE-2026-89671

What the bug is

nfsd3_proc_setacl() calls set_posix_acl() unconditionally for both ACL_TYPE_ACCESS and ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, passing argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default verbatim. The NFSv3 ACL decoder only populates those pointers when the corresponding mask bit is set: nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() if (args->mask & NFS_ACL) decode into acl_access if (args->mask & NFS_DFACL) decode into acl_default /* otherwise the pointer stays NULL (pc_argzero) */ nfsd3_proc_setacl() set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp->acl_access) set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp->acl_default) set_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS "remove this ACL type" operation. A NULL pointer that means "the client did not send this arm" is therefore indistinguishable from "the client asked to remove this ACL". A SETACL with mask=NFS_ACL silently drops the directory's default ACL; mask=0 drops both. The sibling nfsd3_proc_getacl() already consults argp->mask before touching each arm; mirror that in setacl. Fix by wrapping each set_posix_acl() call in the matching mask bit check and initializing error to 0 before inode_lock so that a request with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and returns nfs_ok. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional posix_acl_release() at out: are preserved; both NULL-tolerate the skipped arms.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c

What this is

KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/nfsd/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported

Kernel module

nfsd

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_NFSD|CONFIG_NFSD_V3_ACL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w nfsd

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m

m

a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted

Build switches

CONFIG_NFSD, CONFIG_NFSD_V3_ACL

Reads as

all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source

CVSS

9.1 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsource recompute it

Attack vector

network (AV:N)source

EPSS

0.50%, higher than 41.5% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

fs/nfsd

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
2.6.13	6.6.157	3be1d8611dae
2.6.13	6.12.109	68a80b26efdf
2.6.13	6.18.50	b3bff820d068
2.6.13	7.2.4	ff99ed007f06
2.6.13	7.3	453d7198a0ab

Debian advisories