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CVE-2026-89650

ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3

9.1 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/ceph. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89650 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory. A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker. Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel. Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function. Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/ceph/mdsmap.c

What this is
CEPH DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CEPH)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/ceph/ · ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
ceph

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_CEPH_FS /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ceph

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_CEPH_FS

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
CVSS
9.1 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.50%, higher than 41.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
fs/ceph

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.75.15.2210c4bcc3ba729
4.76.1.18855a06b32438c
4.76.6.157eb3e1a1cb163
4.76.12.1093bf7dba8dba9
4.76.18.5058c2d3e954c1
4.77.2.4332c444f4dc6
4.77.3a3eb169ee297

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP arrives over the kernel Ceph messenger TCP session from a monitor (mon_dispatch/extra_mon_dispatch) or MDS (mds_dispatch) and is decoded in ceph_mdsmap_decode(); a malicious cluster peer or on-path attacker on an unsigned msgr session reaches the bug with network data alone.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker fully controls per-mds info_v and num_export_targets; setting info_v to 2 or 3 (so info_end stays NULL) and an oversized count deterministically advances the cursor past msg->front and hits unchecked ceph_decode_32(), with no race or victim memory layout required.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
The attacker acts as the remote Ceph monitor or MDS peer (or MITM on msgr1/crc or auth_none); no local account, capability, or privilege on the victim CephFS client host is required.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Once CephFS is mounted, the kernel client subscribes to MDS maps and ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap() runs automatically on each update; no further mount, open, or interactive victim action is required at exploit time.
S:UScope, unchanged
The out-of-bounds read, any leaked heap bytes, and a possible oops stay inside the victim host kernel CephFS client and do not cross a VM, container, IOMMU, or other security authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
An attacker-chosen num_export_targets drives an unbounded loop of unchecked ceph_decode_32() reads past the message front slab into adjacent kernel heap (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds); per kernel guidance an unbounded out-of-bounds read is Confidentiality High.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
OOB words are copied only into a correctly sized kcalloc'd export_targets array; overshooting the front buffer then fails later ceph_decode_32_safe() so the map is destroyed and never installed, giving no out-of-bounds write or control-flow primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Walking an attacker-chosen number of u32s past the kmalloc'd msg->front object into unmapped or guarded pages oopses the ceph-msgr worker, and a failed decode also shuts down the mount via ceph_umount_begin(); both are repeatable on each crafted map.