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CVE-2026-89646
ceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/ceph. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89646 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
ceph_dirty_folio() takes a wrbuffer claim on each newly dirtied folio: it bumps i_wrbuffer_ref (taking an ihold() on the 0->1 transition) and attaches the snap_context to folio->private. That claim is released only by ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs(), which for a submitted write runs from writepages_finish(). In ceph_submit_write(), if ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker() fails -- which happens during umount -- the request is aborted before submission: the already-collected folios are only redirtied and unlocked, so writepages_finish() never runs and the claim is leaked. redirty_page_for_writepage() -> folio_redirty_for_writepage() -> filemap_dirty_folio() sets PG_dirty directly and does not go through ->dirty_folio, so ceph_dirty_folio() is not re-entered to rebalance it. Because every subsequent writeback also fails the osd_stopping_blocker, i_wrbuffer_ref never returns to 0, the ihold() is never dropped, and the inode cannot be evicted: VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650! Release the orphaned claim in the abort path before redirtying, via ceph_undo_wrbuffer_claim(): detach the snap_context, drop the wrbuffer reference (letting i_wrbuffer_ref reach 0 and iput() the inode), and drop the snap_context reference -- i.e. do what writepages_finish() would have done for these never-submitted folios. Only the locked_pages entries are undone; folios still in the fbatch were never dirty-cleared by this call (folio_clear_dirty_for_io() is the ownership-transfer point, and a successful move NULLs the fbatch slot), so they hold no claim this call owns.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/ceph/addr.c
- What this is
- CEPH DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CEPH)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/ceph/ · ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- ceph
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_CEPH_FS /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w cephPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switch
- CONFIG_CEPH_FS
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- fs/ceph
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.15 | 6.18.50 | ec32015a955c |
| 6.15 | 7.2.4 | ac7a5a538576 |
| 6.15 | 7.3 | c25aee9c630f |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The leak is in ceph_submit_write() from ceph_writepages_start() during local VFS writeback on umount (ceph_kill_sb → sync_filesystem → do_writepages), not MDS/OSD message handlers. fs/ceph is a kernel client with no network-facing server listener.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Dirtying pages then unmounting drives both sides: ceph_kill_sb waits at most mount_timeout (default 60s) or a killable signal, then sets STOPPING_FLUSHING while writepages_start still holds a blocker and locked folios, so the abort is reached reliably without an uncontrolled race.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- An unprivileged user with write access to an already-mounted CephFS can dirty pages; container/pod teardown, autofs, or systemd performs the umount. CephFS lacks FS_USERNS_MOUNT, but the attacker does not need CAP_SYS_ADMIN themselves.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker dirties files and can trigger or wait for unmount via pod exit, autofs idle unmount, or their own umount; no separate victim action such as opening a file or mounting the filesystem is required.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The leaked inode references and subsequent superblock teardown affect only the host kernel's VFS/Ceph client state within the same security authority; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox escape.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- The leaked ihold pins inodes through generic_shutdown_super so the superblock and ceph_fs_client are destroyed while those inodes remain. Later writeback or iput on the leftover mapping is a use-after-free of the freed superblock, scored High per UAF guidance.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Inodes that survive umount retain address_spaces and pointers into destroyed ceph_fs_client/mdsc state. Subsequent iput_final/writeback operate on freed objects and poisoned i_op/s_op, a UAF write and control-flow primitive scored High.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Unmount reports "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph" and hits CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION in generic_shutdown_super (BUG() with CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION), and VFS_PTR_POISON on surviving inodes guarantees a later oops or panic.