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Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-89633 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-89633

smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2()

9.8 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/smb. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89633 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6568-1 · 2026-10-16 · text6.12.113-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6568-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-16, in 6.12.113-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/smb/client/smb1transport.c

What this is
COMMON INTERNET FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CIFS and SMB3)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/smb/client/ · linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
cifs

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_CIFS|CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY|CONFIG_SMBFS' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w cifs

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release with an answer below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded. The build rule could not be established for 2 releases, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm, trixie?
  • forky, sidm
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switches
CONFIG_CIFS, CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY, CONFIG_SMBFS
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.49%, higher than 40.8% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
fs/smb

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.126.12.11336d01415d881
2.6.126.18.51672cf86aa6aa
2.6.127.2.4033bc80019f0
2.6.127.36343c1da5619

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DSA-6568-12026-10-16trixie 6.12.113-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
coalesce_t2() runs in cifs_demultiplex_thread on SMB1 TRANS2 responses received over TCP/445; a malicious or compromised SMB1 server (or MITM on an unsigned session) delivers the crafted DataOffset/DataCount fields entirely over the network.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The server fully controls DataOffset, DataCount, and TotalDataCount in both primary and secondary TRANS2 PDUs and can force a large first fragment so mid->resp_buf is set; the unbounded memcpy is deterministic with no race or condition outside the attacker’s control.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
The attacker is the remote SMB peer and needs no account or privileges on the victim; coalesce_t2() runs in the demux thread before validate_t2() or any local capability check, and session credentials belong to the client mount, not the attacking server.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Once an SMB1 CIFS mount exists (fstab, autofs, embedded/industrial NAS; CONFIG_CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY defaults on), reconnect and ordinary lookup/readdir/getattr plus cifs_qfs_tcon QUERY_FS_INFO issue TRANS2 automatically, so the server can trigger coalescing with no further user action.
S:UScope, unchanged
The out-of-bounds heap read/write corrupts the client kernel’s own cifs_request slab within the same host security authority; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox boundary crossing.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
An unvalidated source DataOffset lets memcpy read far past the secondary response (DataOffset is a 16-bit value up to 65535 versus a ~16KB cifs_request object), disclosing adjacent kernel heap; the same memory-corruption primitive can be leveraged for further disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
An unvalidated target DataOffset lets memcpy write attacker-controlled bytes past the primary buffer (or backward into the SMB header); the BCC-size guard does not constrain where the copy starts, yielding an out-of-bounds write exploitable for control-flow hijacking.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Reading or writing tens of kilobytes past the cifs_request allocation can fault on unmapped pages and oops or panic the demux thread, and a malicious server can retrigger it on every multi-part TRANS2.