data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-89628 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-89628

HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received

EPSS 0.2%

Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/hid. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89628 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp->raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller's read() count: ret = resp->raw_data[2]; if (ret > s) ret = s; if (copy_to_user(u, resp->raw_data+3, ret)) It never checks resp->raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc'd struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count >= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through the debugfs "eeprom" file: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd] The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not. The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed, so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable. Clamp the copy length to resp->raw_size - 3 (the payload actually received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/hid/hid-picolcd_debugfs.c

What this is
PICOLCD HID DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/hid/hid-picolcd* · linux-input@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
hid_picolcd

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_DEBUG_FS|CONFIG_HID|CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD|CONFIG_HID_SUPPORT' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w hid_picolcd

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixieMnot built on arm64/cloud-arm64
  • forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS, CONFIG_HID, CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD, CONFIG_HID_SUPPORT
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
CVSS
no vector published, unrated
Attack vector
not published
EPSS
0.22%, higher than 11.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/hid

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.355.10.2701a02056c2bf7
2.6.355.15.22165daa322f102
2.6.356.1.1888dc662af0191
2.6.356.6.1574daf432c94a4
2.6.356.12.109a3e6e8d7198a
2.6.356.18.50471f4a939c66
2.6.357.2.4699a3c8b56e1
2.6.357.3e9c667395ac1

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

The kernel CNA published no CVSS vector and no reasoning for CVE-2026-89628, which is why it is shown as unrated rather than given an invented score. 6,405 of the 20,413 CVEs here carry reasoning; this is not one of them.