data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-89620

HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/hid. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89620 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer: memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len); The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches the driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with attacker-controlled length and content. Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix. write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well. That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quickspi/pci-quickspi.c
drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quickspi/quickspi-dev.h
drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quickspi/quickspi-protocol.c

What this is
INTEL TOUCH HOST CONTROLLER (THC) DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/ · Maintained
Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Not established. This site could not find the build rule for the affected file in the kernel trees Debian ships, so it has no answer about whether Debian compiles this code. Read that as unknown, never as absent.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid?
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS

Signals

Published
2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/hid

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.146.18.506fcefe71aeb5
6.147.2.4ee8ad1bb1e96
6.147.3a59cf84441f9

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
An unprivileged local process reaches write_cmd_to_txdma() via hidraw write() or HIDIOCSOUTPUT/HIDIOCSFEATURE ioctls on the Intel THC HIDSPI touch controller's /dev/hidraw node; this is an onboard PCI device, not a network or USB-plug path.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
A single SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE with a length between the device-descriptor max_report_len (typically a few hundred bytes) and HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) deterministically overflows report_buf with attacker-chosen bytes; no race or uninfluenced condition is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
hidraw_open() performs no capability or namespace checks, and systemd uaccess grants the seated user access to /dev/hidraw*, so a normal unprivileged local account can trigger the overflow.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker opens the hidraw node and issues the ioctl or write themselves; no separate victim action is required.
S:UScope, unchanged
The overflow corrupts kernel heap in the host HID/THC driver and any resulting privilege escalation stays within the same kernel security authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The memcpy writes attacker-controlled data past a small heap buffer (up to ~16KB), which can corrupt adjacent objects and be turned into an arbitrary kernel read primitive.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same attacker-controlled heap overflow can overwrite neighboring heap metadata and objects, enabling an arbitrary write and kernel control-flow hijack.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Out-of-bounds heap writes of this size reliably cause kernel oops, panic, or SLUB corruption, and the request can be repeated at will.