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CVE-2026-89619
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/hid. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89619 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
quickspi_hid_raw_request() receives the caller's buffer length in len, but quickspi_get_report() never sees it and copies the whole device-supplied response into buf regardless: memcpy(buf, qsdev->report_buf, qsdev->report_len); qsdev->report_len comes from the input report the touch controller returns, while buf is sized to whatever the caller asked hidraw for through HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT. A response larger than that overflows buf with device-controlled content. The intel-quicki2c sibling already passes the caller length down to quicki2c_get_report() and validates the response against it before the copy. Do the same here.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quickspi/quickspi-hid.c
drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quickspi/quickspi-protocol.c
drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/intel-quickspi/quickspi-protocol.h
- What this is
- INTEL TOUCH HOST CONTROLLER (THC) DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/hid/intel-thc-hid/ · Maintained
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Not established. This site could not find the build rule for the affected file in the kernel trees Debian ships, so it has no answer about whether Debian compiles this code. Read that as unknown, never as absent.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid?
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/hid
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.14 | 6.18.50 | 72706b44b665 |
| 6.14 | 7.2.4 | 54e0bafc0653 |
| 6.14 | 7.3 | 035ec4a71cb8 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- A local attacker reaches the overflow through hidraw HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT on /dev/hidrawN, which calls hidraw_get_report() then quickspi_hid_raw_request(). Intel QuickSPI is a PCI HID-over-SPI touch host, not a network or Bluetooth path.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Opening hidraw and issuing GET_REPORT with a 2-byte ioctl size is enough: hidraw_get_report() kmallocs that size and quickspi_get_report() copies the full device response. A normal touch GET_FEATURE or GET_INPUT_REPORT exceeds 2 bytes, so the overflow does not depend on a race or attacker-uncontrolled layout.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- hidraw_open() has no capability check; access is only the hidraw node. Default 0600 is commonly relaxed by udev uaccess or seat ACLs for the logged-in user on laptops and kiosks, so an unprivileged local user can trigger it without init-namespace root.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker opens the hidraw node and issues the ioctl themselves. No separate victim action such as mounting a filesystem or plugging in a device is required at exploit time.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The overflow corrupts kernel heap in the HID QuickSPI GET_REPORT path on the same host. That is a standard kernel privilege-escalation impact, not a VM, IOMMU, or other security-authority crossing.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- quickspi_get_report() memcpy()s qsdev->report_len bytes into an undersized hidraw kmalloc buffer, overflowing adjacent slab objects. That heap corruption can be turned into an arbitrary kernel read, so confidentiality impact is high even though the copied bytes originate from the touch controller.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- This is an unbounded out-of-bounds kernel heap write. The attacker chooses the destination size, and HID feature reports can be SET then GET so overflow contents are attacker-influenced. Adjacent slab corruption can yield an arbitrary write or control-flow hijack.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Overflowing a 2-byte kmalloc object with a typical HID report corrupts neighboring heap metadata and pointers, which reliably causes a kernel oops or panic even if the attacker does not pursue code execution.