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CVE-2026-89551

SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow

9.8 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sunrpc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89551 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text6.12.111-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text6.12.111-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

xdr_buf_trim() trims `len` bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp: fix_len: buf->len -= (len - trim); When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state: buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately consume far more bytes than buf->len records. The wrapped buf->len then propagates as the authoritative stream bound into every downstream XDR decoder. Fix by clamping the decrement so buf->len bottoms out at zero: buf->len -= min_t(unsigned int, buf->len, len - trim); On the normal path where the iov_lens sum to buf->len, (len - trim) is always <= buf->len and the result is identical to before. No callers change behavior outside the underflow case.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/sunrpc/xdr.c

What this is
KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sunrpc/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
sunrpc

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_SUNRPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w sunrpc

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_SUNRPC

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.51%, higher than 42.5% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/sunrpc

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.95.10.270a3d77bcd974b
3.95.15.221fa16bbe987b4
3.96.1.188a924ac4c78af
3.96.6.1574bf59cb0ea5b
3.96.12.109e6267cccd7b0
3.96.18.50ad0cce80d4af
3.97.2.485e9602650e9
3.97.33f491306dcb6

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4817-12026-10-04bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6528-12026-09-29trixie 6.12.111-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
xdr_buf_trim() is reached from nfsd RPCSEC_GSS privacy unwrap on TCP/2049 (svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv → gss_unwrap → gss_krb5_unwrap_v2) and from the NFS client's gss_unwrap_resp_priv() on every krb5p reply, so a remote NFS peer delivers the wrap token over the network.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
A peer holding the GSS session keys can encrypt a RFC 4121 wrap token so that after decrypt, buf->len is a small wire-derived value while iov_lens remain page-scale; xdr_buf_trim() then subtracts more than buf->len and wraps, with no race or layout outside attacker control.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
A malicious or compromised NFS server that already shares a krb5p GSS context needs no account or capability on the victim client; ordinary krb5p replies and NFSv4.0 GSS callbacks are processed without local privileges on that host.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Once a krb5p NFS mount exists, the client unwraps every privacy-protected reply and NFSv4.0 GSS callback with no further mount, click, or open; idle revalidations and server-driven callbacks are sufficient.
S:UScope, unchanged
The wrapped buf->len and subsequent XDR decode run in the host kernel that processed the RPC and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The underflowed buf->len (~UINT_MAX) becomes the authoritative stream bound, and on nfsd xdr->nwords also underflows via saved_len - buf->len, so later xdr_read_pages/xdr_shrink_bufhead and NFS XDR decoders read far past the receive buffer into adjacent kernel memory.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
xdr_shrink_bufhead() calls xdr_buf_head_shift_right() with a near-UINT_MAX length derived from the wrapped buf->len, and garbage xdr_stream_pos values can index the svc pages[] array out of bounds, an out-of-bounds write exploitable for control-flow hijacking.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Those unbounded XDR copies and the inconsistent xdr_buf (wrapped length versus iov_lens) oops or panic nfsd or the NFS client, and the peer can repeat the request at will.