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CVE-2026-89540
sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sunrpc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89540 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text | 6.1.190-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on sn->gssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized struct mutex. create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net) proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...) /* dentry live */ init_gssp_clnt(sn) mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock) /* too late */ write_gssp() set_gssp_clnt(net) mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock) /* uninitialized */ gssp_rpc_create(...) sn->gssp_clnt = clnt mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock) The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data() returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the registering thread is preempted there while another task is already opening the freshly published file. register_pernet_subsys() runs in preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are already running. A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled struct mutex. On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a "lock used without init" splat; on a production kernel the fast path acquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current). In the latter case a second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner can enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer's clnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser's clnt. Fix by initializing sn->gssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime matches the sunrpc_net it lives in. sn->gssp_clnt is already NULL from the kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no longer needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(). sunrpc.ko is a build-time dependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on every netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc entry.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.c
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_upcall.h
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
net/sunrpc/sunrpc_syms.c
- What this is
- KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sunrpc/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- auth_rpcgss
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_SUNRPC|CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w auth_rpcgssPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_SUNRPC, CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.13%, higher than 2.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/sunrpc
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 3.10 | 5.10.270 | 159a4fab7170 |
| 3.10 | 5.15.221 | b3526ae33519 |
| 3.10 | 6.1.188 | 7f5bcdc8da15 |
| 3.10 | 6.6.157 | 89c8e0733e8c |
| 3.10 | 6.12.109 | f15b87521168 |
| 3.10 | 6.18.50 | edeefb111d61 |
| 3.10 | 7.2.4 | 3f019571928b |
| 3.10 | 7.3 | 5ce1ed615973 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4841-1 | 2026-10-17 | bookworm 6.1.190-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The bug is reached only by write(2) to /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy (write_gssp → set_gssp_clnt → mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock)); remote NFS/RPC peers never hit that procfs path.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker fully controls writer threads that hammer the proc file, and on auth_rpcgss module load register_pernet_subsys() publishes it for every live netns whose tasks are already running; preemption between proc_create_data() and mutex_init() is possible in that preemptible pernet context, so the race is attacker-driven.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- The 0600 use-gss-proxy entry inherits /proc/net ownership from proc_net_ns_init()'s make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0), so an unprivileged user who unshares user+net namespaces owns the file; write_gssp() has no capable() check.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker creates the namespace and writes "1" to the proc file from their own tasks; no victim must mount a filesystem, open a file, or otherwise cooperate.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Uninitialized-mutex use and concurrent rpc_clnt teardown corrupt host kernel memory inside the same kernel security authority; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-boundary impact.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- A writer that wins the race locks a zeroed mutex; mutex_init() can then re-zero owner so a second writer enters set_gssp_clnt() concurrently and rpc_shutdown_client()s a live rpc_clnt, a use-after-free that per kernel guidance yields an arbitrary read primitive.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Concurrent set_gssp_clnt() can shut down an in-use rpc_clnt (UAF) while mutex_init() of a held lock corrupts mutex wait-list state, giving heap/lock-structure writes exploitable for control-flow hijack rather than a pure crash.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES treats the uninitialized lock as a lock-used-without-init splat/oops, and on production kernels the rpc_clnt UAF and corrupted mutex wait lists cause a kernel oops or panic.