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CVE-2026-89537
SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sunrpc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-89537 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | vulnerable | 6.12.113-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg(). None of these accesses check read_token->len first. The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype). All callers accept shorter tokens from the wire: - gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound (offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic(). A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC verifier reads past. - gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400) before passing the wire-supplied length to gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which constructs a mic xdr_netobj and calls gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_verify_header() enforces only checksum.len >= XDR_UNIT (4 bytes) before dispatching to gss_verify_mic(). - svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ() checks only that the checksum fits in gsd->gsd_scratch. Add a length guard at the top of gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(), before any ptr[] access or scatterlist construction. Well-formed MIC tokens from gss_krb5_get_mic_v2() already have exactly GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + cksum_len bytes, so valid traffic is unaffected.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
- What this is
- KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sunrpc/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- rpcsec_gss_krb5
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5|CONFIG_SUNRPC|CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w rpcsec_gss_krb5Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5, CONFIG_SUNRPC, CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.1 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.63%, higher than 49.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/sunrpc
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.35 | 6.18.57 | 996dd15f6012 |
| 2.6.35 | 7.2.4 | 7a946b2e7207 |
| 2.6.35 | 7.3 | b94f6719dcd9 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() is reached from nfsd RPCSEC_GSS on TCP/2049 (svcauth_gss_accept → svcauth_gss_verify_header/unwrap_integ) and from the NFS client processing a remote server's RPCSEC_GSS verifier or krb5i checksum, so a remote peer triggers it with crafted SUNRPC traffic.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- A single RPCSEC_GSS Call or Reply with a MIC/checksum shorter than GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN plus cksum_len (callers accept as little as 4 bytes) deterministically over-reads; no race or attacker-uncontrollable layout is required. Kerberized NFS is a standard enterprise deployment.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- svcauth_gss_verify_header() is the MIC check itself and runs before credentials are verified; the only gate is an rsc-cache lookup on a cleartext, monotonically increasing 64-bit GSS handle that an unauthenticated client can sniff or enumerate. A malicious NFS server needs no privileges on the client.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- On nfsd the over-read is triggered solely by an inbound RPCSEC_GSS message; on the client it fires from the RPC receive path once an NFS/RPCSEC_GSS mount exists. No separate victim action is required at attack time.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The slab over-read and any resulting oops stay inside the host kernel SUNRPC/GSS code. This is ordinary same-host kernel impact, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other changed-scope boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- gss_unwrap_resp_integ() kmallocs only the attacker-chosen checksum length, then gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN+cksum_len (28-40) bytes via gss_krb5_mic_build_sg()/sg_pcopy_to_buffer, an out-of-bounds read of adjacent slab well beyond a few bytes.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The defect is a read-only over-read consumed as a MIC comparison; rfc3961_verify_mic copies those bytes into a local buffer and memcmp()s them. There is no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or control-flow hijack primitive.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Reading 28-40 bytes past a small kmalloc object or past an RPC receive buffer near a page boundary can oops or panic on KASAN, redzone, or unmapped next-page kernels, and the attacker can repeat the crafted RPC to deny NFS service.