CVE-2026-89495

What the bug is

Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm". The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any other node with a malformed message. Three defects: - dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215 attacker-controlled bytes. - dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes. - the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the message is large enough to hold that many entries, so dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len) copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic). The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added (see the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates lockname_len, num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and migration traffic is unaffected. o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can send these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already be a member of the cluster. Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring it exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the same unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes, Read for the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer build faults identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available on request. I reported this privately to security@kernel.org and the ocfs2 maintainers on 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am posting the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement. This patch (of 2): A node receiving a DLM_MIGRATE_REQUEST message trusts the peer-supplied name length (migrate->namelen) without bounding it. dlm_init_mle() then copies that many bytes into the fixed DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX-byte mname[] array of an o2dlm_mle slab object, so a malformed message from a cluster peer overflows the slab object by up to ~215 bytes: a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker-controlled data, reachable by any node in the domain. Reject an oversized name, the way dlm_master_request_handler() and the other o2dlm receive handlers already do; the migration handler omits the check entirely. Conforming messages are unaffected.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c

What this is

ORACLE CLUSTER FILESYSTEM 2 (OCFS2)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/ocfs2/ · ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev · Supported

Kernel module

ocfs2_dlm

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_OCFS2_FS|CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ocfs2_dlm

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64

M

a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it

Build switches

CONFIG_OCFS2_FS, CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB

Reads as

all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source

CVSS

9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it

Attack vector

network (AV:N)source

EPSS

0.71%, higher than 52.8% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

fs/ocfs2

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
2.6.16	5.10.270	e1288865b8ce
2.6.16	5.15.221	aabc5d8388e6
2.6.16	6.1.188	006c96ea488e
2.6.16	6.6.157	24989909d341
2.6.16	6.12.109	f8658ee3327f
2.6.16	6.18.50	de10cd3b062a
2.6.16	7.2.4	2487bea20983
2.6.16	7.3	ea5b5609305a

Debian advisories