Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-81016 in the interactive tracker
CVE-2026-81016
platform/x86/amd/pmc: Propagate SMU errors and validate S2D address
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/platform. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-81016 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6568-1 · 2026-10-16 · text | 6.12.113-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6568-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-16, in 6.12.113-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
amd_stb_s2d_init() discards the return value of several S2D SMU commands. When the SMU refuses a command (e.g. "SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff") the failure is only noticed indirectly - if at all - and reported as -EIO, masking the real error. More seriously, the S2D_PHYS_ADDR_LOW/HIGH return values are ignored, so on failure phys_addr_low/hi are left uninitialised and the assembled address is passed straight to devm_ioremap(). When the SMU leaves them at zero this maps physical address 0 and trips the ioremap-on-RAM warning: amd_pmc AMDI000B:00: SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000000000000 - 0x0000000000ffffff WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 4592 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:... Check the return value of each SMU command and propagate it, and reject a zero physical address before calling devm_ioremap().
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/mp1_stb.c
- What this is
- AMD PMC DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/ · platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- amd_pmc
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_AMD_PMC|CONFIG_X86' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w amd_pmcPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm?
- trixieMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt-arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switches
- CONFIG_AMD_PMC, CONFIG_X86
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.7 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.19%, higher than 8.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/platform
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.18 | 6.12.112 | 638e1ca5d4e2 |
| 5.18 | 6.18.50 | 8178f59d7657 |
| 5.18 | 7.2.4 | 775d4cde1f97 |
| 5.18 | 7.3 | 0225c1d63768 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DSA-6568-1 | 2026-10-16 | trixie 6.12.113-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- amd_stb_s2d_init() runs from amd_pmc_probe() on the AMD PMC ACPI platform driver (AMDI0005–AMDI000C and related IDs) during local device bind or module load; the SMU mailbox commands and devm_ioremap() are not reachable from network, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or USB packet paths.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- On affected AMD platforms where SMU accepts S2D_TELEMETRY_SIZE but rejects S2D_PHYS_ADDR_LOW/HIGH (observed err 0xff), ignored failures leave phys_addr_low/hi uninitialized or zero and the subsequent ioremap is deterministic; stack zeroing makes address 0 reliable, with no race or attacker-uncontrollable layout.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The SMU queries and devm_ioremap() execute automatically in amd_pmc_probe() during ACPI/udev bind with no capable() check; enable_stb=1 is the vulnerable STB debug deployment (kernel cmdline or modprobe), after which kernel context runs the path without a user account or namespace privilege.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim interaction is required; the invalid ioremap occurs during automatic amd_pmc probe at boot or module load when STB is enabled, before any debugfs open, mount, or other user action.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The bad physical-address ioremap, kernel warning, and any subsequent STB debugfs copy occur entirely inside the host kernel PMC driver; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU/DMA boundary bypass, or other cross-authority breakout.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Ignored SMU failures pass uninitialized phys_addr_low/hi to devm_ioremap() for up to 16MB (S2D_TELEMETRY_DRAMBYTES_MAX); a non-RAM physical address creates a mapping that amd_stb_debugfs_open_v2 copies to userspace via memcpy_fromio on the 0644 stb_read node, yielding a large physical-memory disclosure.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The driver only memcpy_fromio()s the STB mapping and never writes through stb_virt_addr; ioremap of RAM at address 0 is rejected, and there is no out-of-bounds write, use-after-free, or other kernel integrity or control-flow primitive.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- devm_ioremap() of physical address 0 hits WARN_ONCE in arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c, which panics under panic_on_warn; when the mapping fails, stb_virt_addr stays NULL while debugfs stb_read remains, so a later open does memcpy_fromio(NULL) and oopses the kernel.