data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-81010 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-81010

io_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem io_uring. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-81010 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.2.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

io_waitid_cb() may run through the fallback task_work path when task_work_add() can no longer queue work to the originating task. The fallback runs from a kworker and io_uring marks such task work as canceled through tw.cancel. io_waitid_cb() currently ignores tw.cancel and calls __do_wait(). waitid is task-context dependent: __do_wait() performs child lookup relative to current, and the retry path also uses current->signal->wait_chldexit. If the callback runs from the fallback kworker, current is therefore not the task that submitted the request. Honor tw.cancel before entering __do_wait(). Complete the request with -ECANCELED and skip the siginfo copy, since canceled task work may run without the submitting task's userspace execution context. Keep the existing siginfo handling for normal waitid completion and explicit cancellation.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

io_uring/waitid.c

What this is
IO_URINGMAINTAINERS section matched on io_uring/ · io-uring@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_IO_URING /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release with an answer below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm?
  • trixie, forky, sidy
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switch
CONFIG_IO_URING

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.18%, higher than 7.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
io_uring

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.76.18.520879697520ab
6.77.2.47bc98e2de8c5
6.77.314572de82e50

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached by submitting IORING_OP_WAITID via io_uring_setup/io_uring_enter, then forcing canceled task_work by closing the ring or exiting the submitting task. Per kernel scoring guidance, io_uring bugs are Local.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls the full sequence: create a DEFER_TASKRUN ring, submit WAITID, fork/signal children so io_waitid_wait queues io_waitid_cb, then close the ring so io_ring_exit_work runs that callback from a kworker with tw.cancel set. No uninfluenced race or rare config is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Unprivileged users can create an io_uring ring (sysctl_io_uring_disabled defaults to 0) and IORING_OP_WAITID has no capability check; waiting on one's own children needs no privilege. User namespaces or init-namespace root are not required.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker performs every step in their own process (ring setup, WAITID submission, child fork/signal, and ring close or exit). No other user must act.
S:UScope, unchanged
Wrong-context waitid completion and the resulting kernel memory corruption stay within the host kernel's security authority. This is standard local privilege-escalation/DoS impact, not a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary crossing.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Ignoring tw.cancel lets io_waitid_cb run __do_wait and unsafe_put_user of siginfo from a PF_KTHREAD fallback worker whose lazy-TLB CR3 may be another mm, including one concurrently torn down by exit_mmap, yielding memory corruption over reused pages/page tables that can be leveraged for kernel disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same kworker path writes siginfo fields through unsafe_put_user to an attacker-chosen userspace address without the submitter's mm, and the -ERESTARTSYS retry can add a wait-queue entry on the kworker's wait_chldexit. Wrong-mm writes and wait-queue corruption are High-integrity primitives.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Userspace access against a missing or tearing-down mm, and wait-queue manipulation on the wrong task, produce kernel faults, oopses, and panics; the unexploited fallback path can also crash or hang ring-teardown. Any kernel crash is High availability.