Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-80970 in the interactive tracker
CVE-2026-80970
ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem sound/usb. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-80970 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
sound/usb/fcp.c
- What this is
- FOCUSRITE CONTROL PROTOCOL/SCARLETT2 MIXER DRIVERS (Scarlett Gen 2+, Clarett, and Vocaster)MAINTAINERS section matched on sound/usb/fcp.c · linux-sound@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- snd_usb_audio
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_SND|CONFIG_SND_USB_AUDIO' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w snd_usb_audioPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 2 releases, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm, trixie?
- forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switches
- CONFIG_SND, CONFIG_SND_USB_AUDIO
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- no vector published, unrated
- Attack vector
- not published
- EPSS
- 0.21%, higher than 10.0% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- sound/usb
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.14 | 6.18.52 | e9e52437120f |
| 6.14 | 7.2.4 | 29ab2df278ab |
| 6.14 | 7.3 | 4335e3877864 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
The kernel CNA published no CVSS vector and no reasoning for CVE-2026-80970, which is why it is shown as unrated rather than given an invented score. 6,405 of the 20,413 CVEs here carry reasoning; this is not one of them.