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CVE-2026-80947
wifi: rtl8xxxu: fix use-after-free from rx_urb_wq on stop
Published 2026-09-11 (37 days ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-80947 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6528-1 · 2026-09-29 · text | 6.12.111-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6528-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-29, in 6.12.111-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.2.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.2.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4817-1 · 2026-10-04 · text | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4817-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-04, in 6.12.111-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
rtl8xxxu arms rx_urb_wq from the RX completion path: rtl8xxxu_rx_complete() hands the URB to rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb(), which queues it on rx_urb_pending_list and, once the list grows past RTL8XXXU_RX_URB_PENDING_WATER, schedules rx_urb_wq. The worker rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() drains rx_urb_pending_list, recovers priv through container_of, and resubmits each URB through rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(), which anchors it on rx_anchor and dereferences priv->udev. rtl8xxxu_stop() cancels the sibling work items (c2hcmd_work, ra_watchdog, update_beacon_work) but never cancels rx_urb_wq, so a worker armed during the last burst of RX traffic can run rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() after rtl8xxxu_disconnect() has called ieee80211_free_hw(), which frees priv, producing a use-after-free. The window opens under active RX traffic (pending count above the watermark) followed by a disconnect. There are two teardown races to close: * rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb() decided whether to enqueue under rx_urb_lock but called schedule_work() after dropping the lock. A completion that observed shutdown == false and released the lock could then call schedule_work() after rtl8xxxu_stop() had set shutdown and cancel_work_sync() had already returned, arming the worker to run after the teardown. Move schedule_work() under the same !shutdown branch so the arming decision is atomic with the shutdown check. * rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() anchors every URB it drained back onto rx_anchor through rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(). A worker still running when usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_anchor) returned would submit a URB that escaped the kill. In rtl8xxxu_stop(), call cancel_work_sync(&priv->rx_urb_wq) before the kill so the worker is drained first. After priv->shutdown is set under rx_urb_lock, completions can no longer queue rx_urb_wq. cancel_work_sync() then drains the last queued or running worker, and the following usb_kill_anchored_urbs() kills the URBs it may have submitted. rtl8xxxu_disconnect() is covered because ieee80211_unregister_hw() guarantees .stop() runs for a live interface before ieee80211_free_hw() frees priv. The probe error path needs no cancel: rx_urb_wq is INIT_WORK()'d there but cannot have been scheduled, since no URB is submitted before ieee80211_register_hw() succeeds. This bug was found by static analysis.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/core.c
- What this is
- RTL8XXXU WIRELESS DRIVER (rtl8xxxu)MAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/ · linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- rtl8xxxu
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_RTL8XXXU|CONFIG_WLAN|CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_REALTEK' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w rtl8xxxuPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm?
- trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, s390x/s390x
- bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switches
- CONFIG_RTL8XXXU, CONFIG_WLAN, CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_REALTEK
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-09-11 (37 days ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.16%, higher than 5.2% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/net
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4 | 6.12.109 | 800d2b490a9a |
| 4.4 | 6.18.50 | 620acb1e8037 |
| 4.4 | 7.2.4 | 972ab8b9c08f |
| 4.4 | 7.3 | 6c080026ecc1 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4817-1 | 2026-10-04 | bookworm 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6528-1 | 2026-09-29 | trixie 6.12.111-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The UAF is reached when rtl8xxxu_stop()/rtl8xxxu_disconnect() runs while rx_urb_wq is armed. An adjacent Wi-Fi peer can complete RX URBs and queue the work, but cannot invoke stop or ieee80211_free_hw(); teardown is a local action (interface down, rfkill, suspend, USB unbind or unplug).
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker controls both sides of the race: they generate RX traffic so rx_urb_pending_count exceeds RTL8XXXU_RX_URB_PENDING_WATER (8) and schedule_work(&rx_urb_wq) fires, then they trigger stop/disconnect while the worker is queued or still resubmitting URBs, retrying until the window after ieee80211_free_hw() is hit.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- An ordinary local user can trigger teardown via logind-mediated suspend, rfkill, or USB unplug on a shared workstation, and needs no capability to generate the RX traffic that queues rx_urb_wq. CAP_NET_ADMIN to bring the interface down is also available via user namespaces when the wiphy is delegated into that netns.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker generates the RX burst and performs the interface stop or USB disconnect themselves; no separate victim must open a file, mount a filesystem, or otherwise interact.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The use-after-free corrupts the rtl8xxxu_priv kernel object and USB URB state inside the host kernel; it does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() recovers the freed priv via container_of and reads priv->udev, priv->fops, and pending-list/rx_anchor state. A sprayed replacement slab object therefore yields an arbitrary kernel read primitive.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The worker list_splice_init()s the freed pending list, usb_anchor_urb()s onto priv->rx_anchor, and the workqueue core mutates the embedded work_struct inside the freed priv, giving heap-write and control-flow hijack primitives.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Executing rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() against freed priv oopses or panics on the spinlock, list, or udev dereference, and the attacker can retrigger it on every device stop or USB disconnect.