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CVE-2026-80662

cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size

7.1 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-28 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/cxl. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-80662 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58 bytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing 64 bytes at offset 0x18. CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512, eight times the actual on-device size. header_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the RAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes. The cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE (512) bytes from its source. For the CPER caller the source is struct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a stack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes of kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can read it via tracefs. Set CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it, bringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords. Userspace tools such as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32) header_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event. Add CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event __array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI. Both callers now pass a zero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only the first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware; the remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring buffer layout intact. [ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ]

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/cxl/core/ras.c
drivers/cxl/core/trace.h
drivers/cxl/cxl.h

What this is
COMPUTE EXPRESS LINK (CXL)MAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/cxl/ · linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_CXL_BUS|CONFIG_CXL_RAS' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm?
  • trixieYnot built on armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, s390x/s390x
  • forky, sidYnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
Y
built in where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switches
CONFIG_CXL_BUS, CONFIG_CXL_RAS
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-28 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.1 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 5.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/cxl

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.26.18.426fc1919a6f2e
6.27.1.5fc5eb0962a5e
6.27.2c268f949e219

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is only reached in kernel CXL RAS error handling (cxl_handle_ras via PCI AER cxl_error_detected, and CPER paths cxl_cper_post_prot_err/extlog_cxl_cper_handle_prot_err). Disclosure requires reading tracefs; there is no network, adjacent-radio, or direct physical-bus syscall entry to the vulnerable memcpy/readl sites.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
With CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ACPI/CXL EINJ via debugfs einj_inject deterministically injects uncorrectable CXL protocol errors that traverse cxl_cper_handle_prot_err/cxl_handle_ras. Without root, a tracing-group member on CXL servers running rasdaemon can reliably capture the leak whenever organic uncorrectable RAS events occur.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Exploitation requires reading cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error data from tracefs (TRACE_MODE_READ 0440), routinely granted to tracing-group/rasdaemon service accounts on CXL/RAS deployments. Triggering on demand uses debugfs EINJ (root) or natural hardware errors; no init-namespace-only capability beyond tracefs DAC is needed for the stack leak.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Once CXL tracepoints are enabled (as rasdaemon does automatically), uncorrectable RAS/CPER processing copies the overlong header_log during kernel error handling. No victim mount, login, or interactive action is required beyond the attacker (or environment) having tracefs access when an error fires.
S:UScope, unchanged
The flaw leaks kernel stack/MMIO data into the trace ring buffer within the host kernel. Impact stays in the same OS security authority (local privilege/information gain) and does not cross guest/host, IOMMU, or container hardware trust boundaries.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
TP_fast_assign memcpy() copies 512 bytes from a 64-byte ras_cap.header_log on the stack, leaking 448 bytes of kernel stack into tracefs. header_log_copy() also readl()s 128 dwords from an 88-byte RAS iomap, an out-of-bounds read of adjacent MMIO/device memory.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
Both failure modes are out-of-bounds reads only (stack and MMIO). The trace event stores leaked bytes in the ring buffer but does not corrupt attacker-controlled memory or provide a direct arbitrary-write primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
header_log_copy() performs 448 bytes of MMIO reads past the devm_ioremap() RAS window (0x58 bytes), which can provoke CPU/MMU faults or platform errors on out-of-range readl(). Uncorrectable-error handling itself can disable CXL.mem devices and force resets, impacting availability.