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CVE-2026-80590
inet: frags: strip GSO state from fragments before reassembly
Published 2026-08-28 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/ipv4. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-80590 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text | 6.1.187-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6477-1 · 2026-08-29 · text | 6.12.107-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6477-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-29, in 6.12.107-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.12-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.12-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text | 6.12.107-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
A virtio_net_hdr (tun/tap, or AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR) can mark an IPv4 or IPv6 fragment as GSO; nothing relates gso_type to frag_off. inet_frag_reasm_prepare()/inet_frag_reasm_finish() keep the first fragment's skb as the head of the reassembled datagram, including its shinfo->gso_size/gso_type/gso_segs, and chain the remaining fragments on frag_list with whatever linear/paged layout they arrived with. After ip_defrag() (ip_local_deliver(), nf_defrag_ipv4, ...) the reassembled skb therefore still claims to be GSO (SKB_GSO_DODGY), and the next software segmentation point - udp_rcv_segment() on local delivery, validate_xmit_skb(), or the ip_finish_output_gso() slow path - hands it to skb_segment(). skb_segment()'s frag_list walk assumes GRO-shaped input and hits one of its BUG_ON()s. Two writes to a tap by an unprivileged user in its own userns are enough: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4899! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 82 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.2.0-pentest+ #2 RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x20ca/0x48b0 Call Trace: <TASK> __udp_gso_segment+0x29a/0x27d0 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x458/0x6c0 inet_gso_segment+0x429/0x1340 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x233/0x4f0 __skb_gso_segment+0x308/0x660 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x440/0xad0 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0xc7/0x2c0 udp_rcv+0x16ce/0x2260 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x197/0x2d0 ip_local_deliver+0x430/0x690 ip_rcv+0x16f/0x1f0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15e/0x1c0 __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x110 netif_receive_skb+0xf6/0x5c0 tun_rx_batched.isra.0+0x3ab/0x790 tun_get_user+0x17c3/0x3550 tun_chr_write_iter+0xba/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x646/0x1130 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This runs with BH disabled, so it is a panic rather than an oops. The same is reachable with CAP_NET_RAW in a netns where a defrag point precedes a GSO point, and from a guest whose VMM forwards virtio_net_hdr to a tap. The SKB_GSO_DODGY frag_list checks added by commit 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list") and by commit 9e4b7a99a03a ("net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head alloc types") do not cover it: page-backed heads skip them, and kmalloc heads skip them when gso_size == skb_headlen(head), which the sender controls. An skb entering a frag queue is an IP fragment by definition and cannot legitimately carry GSO state: GRO does not merge fragments and the stack segments before it fragments, so only untrusted sources are affected. This has been reachable since commit f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr"), the first path that let userspace attach GSO metadata to an IP fragment. Reset the GSO fields of every fragment as it is queued, in inet_frag_queue_insert(), which IPv4, IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm and 6lowpan reassembly share; then neither the head nor the frag_list members of the reassembled skb carry them (the members matter too: the ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() fast paths send them out as they are). The head may remain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; that is already accepted on receive and resolved by skb_checksum_help() in ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() on forward. Tested on top of net.git (dc4b95b8fee9), x86_64: the tap reproducer above, two further IPv4 frag_list geometries that reach BUG_ON(i >= nfrags) and BUG_ON(!list_skb->head_frag), and an IPv6 fragment-header variant (udp6_ufo_fragment()) each panic the unpatched kernel; with this patch all four datagrams are delivered intact and nothing is logged.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
- What this is
- NETWORKING [IPv4/IPv6]MAINTAINERS section matched on net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_INET /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12y
- y
- built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
- Build switch
- CONFIG_INET
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-28 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 8.6 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.58%, higher than 46.5% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/ipv4
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.27 | 5.10.268 | cfdbc8c2e6f9 |
| 2.6.27 | 5.15.219 | 29dda278a5ed |
| 2.6.27 | 6.1.186 | 14a8f3e10fa9 |
| 2.6.27 | 6.6.155 | 3edf721bb4b9 |
| 2.6.27 | 6.12.107 | dec2edb7aaf1 |
| 2.6.27 | 6.18.48 | c49f04e8d2b9 |
| 2.6.27 | 7.1.12 | 69b73b74d9eb |
| 2.6.27 | 7.2.2 | da857e448322 |
| 2.6.27 | 7.3 | d5dc1e69fd72 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4788-1 | 2026-09-19 | bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DLA-4777-1 | 2026-09-08 | bookworm 6.1.187-1 | tracker |
| DSA-6477-1 | 2026-08-29 | trixie 6.12.107-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- A malicious cloud VM guest injects virtio_net_hdr-marked IPv4/IPv6 fragments through virtio-net/vhost-tap into the host ip_rcv() path; the same inet_frag reassembly and skb_segment() crash also fires on validate_xmit_skb()/ip_finish_output_gso() when such skbs traverse forwarding.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker fully controls virtio_net_hdr gso_type/gso_size and fragment geometry; the commit reproduces a host panic from two tap writes with no races, timing, or uncontrollable memory layout required.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- On typical KVM/QEMU tap-backed virtio-net deployments a tenant VM needs no host account or capability; exploitation uses only the pre-provisioned virtual NIC, not init-namespace root or CAP_NET_ADMIN on the host.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Packet injection, ip_defrag reassembly, and GSO segmentation run automatically in softirq once crafted virtio fragments are sent; no victim mount, click, or other cooperative action is required.
- S:CScope, changed
- A guest VM tenant can panic the host kernel by crossing the hypervisor virtio/tap boundary, impacting resources outside the guest security authority even though the demonstrated primitive is denial of service rather than full escape.
- C:NConfidentiality impact, none
- Impact is an intentional BUG_ON in skb_segment() frag_list handling; there is no demonstrated out-of-bounds read, use-after-free, or other information-disclosure primitive before the assertion aborts.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The failure aborts in skb_segment() before any out-of-bounds write, page-desc conversion, or control-flow hijack; attacker-controlled metadata only reaches a defensive assertion, not a memory modification primitive.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Triggering skb_segment() BUG_ON from tun_rx/tun_get_user runs with BH disabled and causes a fatal kernel panic, fully and repeatedly denying availability of the affected host until reboot.