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CVE-2026-80560
openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn
Published 2026-08-26 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem arch/openrisc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-80560 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text | 6.1.187-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.105-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.105-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text | 6.12.107-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space. All other SR bits are left under user control. An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME. With the data MMU disabled the CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local privilege escalation. SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way. The ptrace GPR regset already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason. Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on signal entry. Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
arch/openrisc/include/asm/processor.h
arch/openrisc/kernel/signal.c
- What this is
- OPENRISC ARCHITECTUREMAINTAINERS section matched on arch/openrisc/ · linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12y
- y
- built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-26 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.18%, higher than 6.6% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- arch/openrisc
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | 5.10.266 | bc2e24ba6e16 |
| 3.1 | 5.15.217 | cf1b5514ddf9 |
| 3.1 | 6.1.184 | cd8b43a71755 |
| 3.1 | 6.6.153 | b4d73c3848ba |
| 3.1 | 6.12.105 | 89a91b30685c |
| 3.1 | 6.18.46 | a88d688be8d7 |
| 3.1 | 7.1.10 | 212fc482ddd7 |
| 3.1 | 7.2 | 32ef1b30ad73 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4788-1 | 2026-09-19 | bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DLA-4777-1 | 2026-09-08 | bookworm 6.1.187-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The flaw is only reachable through the local rt_sigreturn syscall path (userspace trap to _sys_call_handler, sys_rt_sigreturn, restore_sigcontext, then l.rfe); OpenRISC signal handling has no network, adjacent-wireless, or physical-device entry point.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Exploitation is deterministic because the attacker fully controls the rt_sigframe SR field and can invoke rt_sigreturn directly; the fix author verified an unprivileged PoC on qemu-system-or1k that clears SPR_SR_DME and writes arbitrary physical memory.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Any unprivileged local process can call rt_sigreturn with a crafted sigframe on its own stack; the path performs only access_ok/copy_from_user checks and has no capability, authentication, or init-namespace root requirement.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No separate victim interaction is needed; the attacker can self-send a signal or directly syscall rt_sigreturn with a forged stack frame in their own process without requiring another user to mount, plug in, or approve anything.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- This is standard host-kernel privilege escalation by restoring attacker-controlled CPU privilege bits on sigreturn; it does not cross a VM guest/host, container sandbox, or IOMMU security boundary despite granting direct physical memory access.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Clearing SPR_SR_DME disables data MMU translation and protection, allowing an unprivileged task to read arbitrary physical addresses including kernel memory; other exposed SR bits (SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, cache enables) further broaden privileged-state disclosure.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- With SPR_SR_DME cleared the CPU performs unprotected physical data accesses, giving arbitrary read/write to all of RAM; the fix commit PoC writes a marker beyond the kernel mem=32M reservation, demonstrating direct integrity compromise and local root escalation.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Arbitrary physical memory writes can corrupt kernel text, data, or device MMIO and trigger oops or panic; manipulating privileged SR and cache-control bits can also destabilize the system even when full exploitation is not attempted.