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CVE-2026-80527
ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted
Published 2026-08-26 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/ceph. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-80527 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text | 6.1.187-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.105-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.105-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text | 6.12.107-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`). One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD` from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`. If the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read caps. In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need <= mds_wanted` and returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`. If the cap update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after `cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to wake it up. The ordering issue is that `cap->mds_wanted` is updated in __prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS already knows it wants. A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS. However, simply moving the `cap->mds_wanted assignment` later would not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption. Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state machine. To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a simpler workaround: - stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait, fall back to the renew path - make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous `OPEN` request whenever the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of only calling ceph_check_caps() The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can still hold something like `pLs` and yet be missing `FILE_RD` completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not sufficient, because it still trusts `cap->mds_wanted` and may resend nothing. By requiring `(issued & wanted) == wanted` before taking the asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the `wanted caps` are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the synchronous `OPEN` renew. This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually retries through a path that does not rely on the stale `mds_wanted` state. [ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to mds_client.h, formatting ]
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/ceph/caps.c
fs/ceph/file.c
fs/ceph/mds_client.h
- What this is
- CEPH DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CEPH)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/ceph/ · ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- ceph
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_CEPH_FS /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w cephPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switch
- CONFIG_CEPH_FS
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-26 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.50%, higher than 41.6% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- fs/ceph
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.8 | 5.10.266 | b5661524c5a4 |
| 5.8 | 5.15.217 | 5e84bc6f67e1 |
| 5.8 | 6.1.184 | 5fedf279a1ea |
| 5.8 | 6.6.153 | e05c315b4da0 |
| 5.8 | 6.12.105 | fcce1b3be6d2 |
| 5.8 | 6.18.46 | a3bc6b3e9ef3 |
| 5.8 | 7.1.10 | 9e55fe24c548 |
| 5.8 | 7.2 | 50958bb928ba |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4788-1 | 2026-09-19 | bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DLA-4777-1 | 2026-09-08 | bookworm 6.1.187-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- On nodes with cephfs mounted (common in Ceph/Rook/Kubernetes), a remote Ceph client can perform conflicting writes so the MDS revokes FILE_RD via CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS over the network; the victim kernel then hits the stale mds_wanted hang on the next VFS read/mmap/ioctl path into __ceph_get_caps().
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The fix commit documents MDS cap revocation from another client as a reliable trigger; an attacker controls both sides by holding a second Ceph client session and driving conflicting I/O and reconnect/message-loss timing, without depending on uncontrollable victim heap layout or rare kernel configs.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- Exploitation requires no Linux account, capability, or init-namespace root on the victim host; any remote (or co-tenant) Ceph client with write access to the shared file can induce revocation and the hang while victims only perform normal reads on an already-mounted cephfs export.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No interactive victim action is needed beyond routine automated reads on cephfs-backed workloads; the attacker does not require the victim to mount media, click a link, or perform a one-off administrative step at exploitation time.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Impact is confined to threads blocked in __ceph_get_caps() on the same host kernel security domain; it does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU boundaries or grant elevated privileges beyond availability loss on the affected client.
- C:NConfidentiality impact, none
- This is a capability wait-loop logic error with no out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, or information disclosure; stale mds_wanted only prevents cap reacquisition and does not read or leak kernel or file data to an attacker.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The bug does not modify inode data, kernel memory, or capabilities; it causes indefinite sleeping in cap acquisition with no path to arbitrary write, metadata corruption, or code execution.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Before the fix, __ceph_get_caps() could wait forever on i_cap_wq when mds_wanted falsely indicated FILE_RD was already requested but not issued, hanging the reader thread (read/write/mmap/getattr) until unrelated cap traffic; repeated exploitation can deny service to cephfs-backed applications.