data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-74743

macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev

9.8 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-08-26 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74743 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text6.1.187-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.105-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.105-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.10-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.10-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text6.12.107-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

macvlan devices inherit hard_header_len from lowerdev during macvlan_init(), but leave needed_headroom and needed_tailroom set to 0. When the underlying lowerdev requires extra headroom or tailroom for headers/trailers (e.g. macsec, ipsec, wireguard, tunnels, or veth with rx headroom), upper layers calculating packet headroom and tailroom fail to reserve sufficient space. This can result in reallocation overhead, skb headroom underflows, or KASAN slab-use-after-free crashes when dev_hard_header() / macvlan_hard_header() prepends header data or when lower devices append tailroom. Fix this by: 1. Inheriting needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev in macvlan_init(). 2. Propagating needed_headroom and needed_tailroom updates to attached macvlans in macvlan_device_event() when receiving NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE events.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/net/macvlan.c

What this is
NETWORKING DRIVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
macvlan

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_MACVLAN /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w macvlan

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_MACVLAN

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-26 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.54%, higher than 44.0% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.235.10.271c2ef3f134b06
2.6.235.15.2227b0eb3e0f363
2.6.236.1.1848cd90e850e43
2.6.236.6.15328afc87bd8da
2.6.236.12.1058f6a05dbac05
2.6.236.18.4696fa90b74385
2.6.237.1.10bc9a00fb78e3
2.6.237.2cef51860becd

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4788-12026-09-19bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1tracker
DLA-4777-12026-09-08bookworm 6.1.187-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The bug fires on the macvlan transmit path (ip_finish_output2/neigh_resolve_output/macvlan_hard_header) when kernel-generated replies or forwarded traffic egress a macvlan netdev; remote peers trigger this by sending TCP/UDP/ICMP to an address on a pre-configured macvlan interface.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Once macvlan is stacked on a lowerdev with nonzero needed_headroom (WireGuard, MACsec, IPsec, tunnels, veth RX headroom), ordinary packets reliably hit under-reserved skb headroom/tailroom during dev_hard_header() without races or uncontrollable timing.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
A remote attacker needs no local account or capabilities; sending routable traffic to a macvlan address suffices. Administrative macvlan setup is environmental (like other netdev CVEs), not an attacker privilege requirement.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation requires only normal network delivery to a reachable macvlan address; no victim must open files, mount filesystems, or perform any interactive action beyond existing connectivity.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is kernel skb heap corruption, slab-use-after-free, or panic within the host network stack; it does not cross VM, IOMMU, or container security boundaries into a separate authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The fix commit documents KASAN slab-use-after-free from skb headroom underflow during header prepending; this class of kernel heap corruption is exploitable for arbitrary memory disclosure beyond a bounded leak.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Insufficient headroom causes skb_push underflows and slab UAF during pskb_expand_head/reallocation, providing kernel heap write primitives that can be leveraged for control-flow hijacking and privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The failure mode includes skb_under_panic (kernel BUG/panic) and KASAN-detected slab UAF crashes, causing immediate host kernel denial of service on affected transmit paths.