data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-74588 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-74588

sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on

9.8 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-08-22 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sctp. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74588 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text6.1.187-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6466-1 · 2026-08-25 · text6.12.105-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6466-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-25, in 6.12.105-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.9-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.9-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.9-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.9-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text6.12.107-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

__sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport's transmitted list without updating chunk->transport: if (chunk->tsn_gap_acked) { list_move_tail(&chunk->transmitted_list, &transport->transmitted); continue; } The chunk then sits on a live transport's list while chunk->transport still names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer() from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk is left with a dangling pointer. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() scrubs peer->transmitted and asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list, but the chunk is on neither. The pointer is not followed while tsn_gap_acked is set. A SACK that reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches tchunk->transport->flight_size -= sctp_data_size(tchunk); inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer(). Both the removal and the SACKs come from the association peer. Set chunk->transport at the move. The ordinary resend path needs nothing: it reaches its list_move_tail() only after sctp_packet_append_chunk() returned SCTP_XMIT_OK, and __sctp_packet_append_chunk() has rebound the chunk by then. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/sctp/outqueue.c

What this is
SCTP PROTOCOLMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sctp/ · linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
sctp

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_IP_SCTP /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w sctp

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_IP_SCTP

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-22 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.50%, higher than 41.5% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/sctp

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.125.10.2656575fb172308
2.6.125.15.2166b9e2ea20571
2.6.126.1.183874a7c2b5e18
2.6.126.6.1521adf929121e1
2.6.126.12.104e2e7c1de0e22
2.6.126.18.452b3b5eec8b2c
2.6.127.1.95ccf35ef0ed6
2.6.127.29f2cf069a9a7

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4788-12026-09-19bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1tracker
DLA-4777-12026-09-08bookworm 6.1.187-1tracker
DSA-6466-12026-08-25trixie 6.12.105-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The bug is reached when the kernel SCTP stack processes inbound SACK and ASCONF chunks from a remote association peer via sctp_rcv()/sctp_inq_push(), with no local syscall or ioctl required on the victim.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The remote peer controls the SCTP protocol sequence (gap SACKs, ADDIP multihoming, ASCONF Delete-IP, and SACK reneging) needed to strand a chunk and free its transport; no attacker-uncontrollable race or rare memory layout is required.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Exploitation requires only network access as an established SCTP association peer sending authenticated protocol traffic; no local Linux account, capability, or namespace privilege is needed on the victim host.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim user action is required beyond normal automated SCTP server/client operation; the attacker drives the entire trigger sequence with crafted SACK and ASCONF packets on the existing association.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to kernel memory corruption and potential privilege escalation within the host kernel; it does not cross a VM, container, or IOMMU security boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
KASAN reports a slab use-after-free read through dangling chunk->transport in sctp_check_transmitted(); UAF on sctp_transport objects can be groomed for arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The UAF dereference performs flight_size arithmetic on a freed sctp_transport slab object, enabling heap grooming and arbitrary kernel write or control-flow hijack primitives typical of SCTP transport UAFs.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Accessing freed transport memory during SACK processing can cause kernel oops/panic and repeatable remote denial of service against any SCTP endpoint handling the malicious peer traffic.