data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-74520 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-74520

iommu/iommufd: Fix IOPF group ownership UAF

8.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/iommu. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74520 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.8-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.8-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.8-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.8-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

iopf_group_alloc() links each last-page IOPF group into the generic IOPF pending list before invoking the domain fault handler. iommufd_fault_iopf_handler() also queued an accepted group in the IOMMUFD deliver list without removing it from the generic pending list. When detach or HWPT replacement drops the device's IOPF reference count to zero, an IOMMU driver may call iopf_queue_remove_device(). That function responds to and frees groups through the generic pending list without removing the same groups from IOMMUFD's deliver list or response xarray. A later read, response, or cleanup can then access the freed group and cause a UAF. Fix this by dequeuing an accepted group from the generic pending list before IOMMUFD queues it for userspace response. Make iopf_group_response() send a response regardless of pending-list membership, so the dequeued group can still be completed by IOMMUFD.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/iommu/io-pgfault.c
drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c
include/linux/iommu.h

What this is
IOMMU SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/iommu/ · iommu@lists.linux.dev · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_IOMMU_IOPF|CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormYnot built on arm64/arm64, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, i386/686, i386/686-pae, i386/rt/686-pae, ppc64el/powerpc64le
  • trixieYnot built on arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
  • forky, sidYnot built on arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt-arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
Y
built in where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_IOMMU_IOPF, CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/iommu

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.116.18.446da8f37419dd
6.117.1.84e74a3692364
6.117.2738e6f32e61d

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local ioctl/read/write on /dev/iommu or /dev/vfio and the iommufd fault-queue fd; the UAF is reached only through userspace-driven IOPF setup, fault delivery, and detach/HWPT-replace, not via any network packet or remote protocol handler.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides of the race by concurrently triggering IOMMU page faults (device DMA to unmapped IOVAs) and detaching or replacing the HWPT via iommufd ioctls, then reading/responding on the fault fd; no victim timing or uncontrollable memory layout is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Only a local process with access to an iommufd/VFIO context and an IOPF-capable assigned device (typical GPU/accelerator passthrough tenant) is needed; no host root/CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required once the device is bound to the caller's iommufd fd.
UI:NUser interaction, none
All steps—allocating the fault queue, attaching a fault-enabled HWPT, provoking PRI/IOPF events, detaching/replacing, and reading/writing the fault fd—are performed entirely by the attacking process without requiring any separate victim user action.
S:CScope, changed
The UAF corrupts iopf_group objects that hold attach_handle and fault_param pointers governing IOMMU page-fault responses and DMA translation; successful exploitation can bypass IOMMU DMA isolation or compromise the host from a VFIO device assignment security boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Use-after-free of iopf_group lets an attacker reclaim the freed slab and control fields such as attach_handle and fault_param, enabling arbitrary kernel memory reads through subsequent fault-queue read/response paths and iopf_group_response dereferences.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Controlled reuse of the freed iopf_group can corrupt list/xarray links and attach_handle pointers used by iopf_group_response and IOMMU fault completion, providing heap-spray-based arbitrary write and potential control-flow hijack for privilege escalation or DMA remapping.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Accessing a freed iopf_group during fault-fd read, write, auto-response on detach, or fault-object destruction causes kernel oops/panic; the bug is a confirmed UAF in a hot fault-handling path with reliably triggerable crash outcomes.