data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-74473

vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()

9.8 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74473 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text6.1.187-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6466-1 · 2026-08-25 · text6.12.105-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6466-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-25, in 6.12.105-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.8-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.8-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.8-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.8-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text6.12.107-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c

What this is
NETWORKING DRIVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
vxlan

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_VXLAN /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w vxlan

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_VXLAN

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.53%, higher than 43.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.85.10.265c419af4924c1
3.85.15.2166bd0a3a1b574
3.86.1.183214ba43faf10
3.86.6.15142887be7c4cf
3.86.12.103aa0d31376d57
3.86.18.44ee799977d794
3.87.1.84f3f96e771a2
3.87.226bb2dd0a883

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4788-12026-09-19bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1tracker
DLA-4777-12026-09-08bookworm 6.1.187-1tracker
DSA-6466-12026-08-25trixie 6.12.105-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
route_shortcircuit() runs in vxlan_xmit() during overlay transmit; remote packets forwarded or routed onto a VXLAN netdev with route-short-circuit enabled reach this path without local access, matching net-stack guidance for network-reachable packet processing on cloud/SDN nodes.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably craft non-linear skbs (scatter/gather/frags and size boundaries) and aim traffic at a known router MAC in the VXLAN FDB; no race or uncontrollable memory layout is required beyond targeting an RSC-enabled deployment, which is the scored scenario.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Exploitation needs no credentials or capabilities on the victim when VXLAN RSC is already configured; a remote peer only has to send IPv4/IPv6 frames that traverse the tunnel transmit path, with no netlink setup or CAP_NET_ADMIN in the target namespace.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Triggering the bug requires only attacker-controlled network traffic through the overlay; no victim mount, file open, link click, or other interactive action is needed.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to the kernel hosting the VXLAN endpoint (memory disclosure, packet-header corruption, or crash); it does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU security boundaries by itself.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The faulty pskb_may_pull() check leaves the IP/IPv6 header in non-linear frags, so ip_hdr(skb)->daddr/ipv6 daddr is read past the linear head and can disclose adjacent kernel memory per OOB-read guidance.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The out-of-bounds destination address feeds neigh_lookup() and may rewrite eth_hdr()->h_dest before encapsulation, giving attacker-influenced overlay forwarding and a memory-safety primitive in the transmit path.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Dereferencing network-header fields beyond the pulled linear buffer can provoke kernel oops/panic on affected skb layouts, and OOB reads in xmit context are treated as high availability impact even when exploitation is not fully weaponized.