data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-74430 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-74430

rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling

7.5 EPSS 0.6% AV:N

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/rxrpc. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74430 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers. A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued. In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a null-pointer dereference. Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means: (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may still happen). The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the first packet is transmitted. RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the reply to be received. (2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong state. Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this. (3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition. Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL packet[1].

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
net/rxrpc/call_event.c
net/rxrpc/call_object.c
net/rxrpc/conn_client.c
net/rxrpc/input.c
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c

What this is
RXRPC SOCKETS (AF_RXRPC)MAINTAINERS section matched on net/rxrpc/ · linux-afs@lists.infradead.org · Supported
Kernel module
rxrpc

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_AF_RXRPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w rxrpc

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_AF_RXRPC

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.61%, higher than 48.1% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
net/rxrpc

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.146.18.408db6a2c95e36
6.147.1.5523cb585672a
6.147.29b6ce5948085

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
Forged ACKALL packets reach rxrpc_input_ackall() via UDP through rxrpc_encap_rcv() and the normal RxRPC receive path on internet-reachable AFS/AF_RXRPC servers without local access.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker opens the call with DATA then immediately sends ACKALL while the server call is in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST, reliably triggering the NULL tx_queue dereference without races or special timing.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Only network access to an RxRPC listener is required; ACKALL is not cryptographically verified on input and the crash occurs on new service calls before reply transmission, including during pre-authentication connection setup.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim user action is required beyond a host running an affected RxRPC/AFS service; exploitation is accomplished entirely by attacker-crafted network packets.
S:UScope, unchanged
The vulnerability causes a kernel NULL-pointer dereference and crash within the RxRPC subsystem on the same host, not a cross-boundary escape such as VM guest-to-host or sandbox breakout.
C:NConfidentiality impact, none
This is a pure NULL-pointer dereference with no out-of-bounds read, use-after-free, or other memory corruption that could disclose kernel data to the attacker.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
No memory corruption or attacker-controlled writes occur; the fault path only dereferences a NULL tx_queue pointer and cannot be leveraged for arbitrary modification or code execution.
A:HAvailability impact, high
A forged ACKALL in an invalid call state causes rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() to dereference NULL call->tx_queue, producing a kernel oops or panic and denying availability of the RxRPC/AFS server and potentially the entire host.