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CVE-2026-74315
lockd: Avoid hashing uninitialized bytes in nlm4svc_lookup_file()
Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/lockd. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74315 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
file_hash() digests the first LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE bytes of nfs_fh.data when bucketing nlm_files[], independent of fh.size. Commit 3de744ee4e45 ("lockd: Use xdrgen XDR functions for the NLMv4 TEST procedure") set .pc_argzero to zero for the converted procedures and moved file-handle population into nlm4svc_lookup_file(), which copies only xdr_lock->fh.len bytes into lock->fh.data. When an NLMv4 client presents a file handle shorter than LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE, bytes fh.len..31 retain whatever the argument buffer held from an earlier request. The same wire handle then hashes to different buckets across calls; nlm_lookup_file() misses the existing nlm_file entry, and lock-state lookups fail. Zero only the tail bytes that file_hash() would otherwise consume. Handles of LOCKD_FH_HASH_SIZE or larger already populate every byte that file_hash() reads.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/lockd/lockd.h
fs/lockd/svc4proc.c
fs/lockd/svcsubs.c
- What this is
- KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/lockd/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- lockd
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_LOCKD|CONFIG_LOCKD_V4' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w lockdPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_LOCKD, CONFIG_LOCKD_V4
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.55%, higher than 45.0% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- fs/lockd
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | 7.1.5 | 686c2434f9f1 |
| 7.1 | 7.2 | 6e4c62caecf7 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- The bug is reached via remote NLMv4 RPC to in-kernel lockd (TCP/UDP SunRPC, typically alongside nfsd), from svc_process() through nlm4svc_proc_* handlers into nlm4svc_lookup_file() and nlm_lookup_file().
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- An NFS client can reliably trigger this by sending NLMv4 LOCK/TEST/SHARE/etc. with a file handle shorter than 32 bytes; stale tail bytes come from the same worker's prior RPC argument buffer, which the attacker can influence with earlier requests.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- lockd_authenticate() accepts RPC_AUTH_NULL/RPC_AUTH_UNIX and, for normal procedures, svc_set_client(); no local UID, capabilities, or root in the host namespace is required—only network reachability as an NFS export client (AUTH_NULL is explicitly supported for NLM).
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Exploitation requires only crafted NLMv4 RPC traffic to a running lockd/nfsd instance; no victim mount, file open, or other interactive action beyond normal NFS client participation.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Impact is confined to the NFS server's kernel lockd/nfsd authority (file-lock and DOS-share state on exported files); it does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU security boundaries.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- file_hash() sums the first 32 bytes of nfs_fh.data regardless of fh.size; when fh.len<32, bytes fh.len..31 are stale prior-request buffer contents, so each lookup performs an out-of-bounds read of up to 31 bytes used in security-relevant file-table indexing.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Inconsistent hashing creates duplicate nlm_file entries for the same wire handle; per-entry f_shares and nlm_block state diverge while both open the same inode, enabling DOS share-mode bypass and incorrect lock/block bookkeeping despite VFS-level enforcement.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Missed nlm_file lookups cause lock-state lookup failures, incorrect NLM responses, hung or failing NFS lock clients, and unbounded duplicate nlm_file/VFS opens that can exhaust server lock-manager resources on production NFS file servers.