data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-74314 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-74314

bpf: Cancel special fields on map value recycle

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem include/linux. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74314 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Map update and delete paths currently call bpf_obj_free_fields() when a value is being replaced or recycled. That makes field destruction depend on the context of the update/delete operation. For tracing programs this can include NMI context, where referenced kptr destructors, uptr unpinning, and graph root destruction are not generally safe. Introduce bpf_obj_cancel_fields() for the reusable-value path. It only performs NMI-safe cleanup for timer, workqueue, and task_work fields. Fields that need full destruction are left attached to the recycled value and are destroyed by the final cleanup path instead. Switch array and hashtab update/delete/recycle paths to this cancel helper. Keep bpf_obj_free_fields() for final map destruction and for bpf_mem_alloc destructors. Preallocated hashtabs do not have allocator destructors, so teardown continues to walk the normal and extra elements and fully destroy their fields. This deliberately relaxes the eager-free semantics of map update/delete for special fields. Programs that relied on a recycled map slot becoming empty immediately after update/delete were relying on behavior that cannot be implemented safely from every BPF execution context without offloading arbitrary destructors. There is a chance this change breaks programs making assumptions regarding the eager freeing of fields. If so, we can relax semantics to cancellation only when irqs_disabled() is true in the future. However, theoretically, map values that get reused eagerly already have weaker guarantees as parallel users can recreate freed fields before the new element becomes visible again.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

include/linux/bpf.h
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
kernel/bpf/syscall.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/htab_update.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/map_kptr.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/htab_update.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/linked_list.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr.c

What this is
BPF [CORE]MAINTAINERS section matched on include/linux/bpf* · bpf@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BPF|CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switches
CONFIG_BPF, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.18%, higher than 6.8% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
include/linux

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.197.1.59ea734e2cc01
5.197.2a3a81d247651
5.18.1800

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached via bpf_map_update_elem/delete_elem on BPF array/hash maps, callable from the bpf() syscall and from in-kernel BPF helpers when tracing or perf BPF programs run; per kernel guidance BPF is a Local attack vector, not network-reachable.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker who can load and attach BPF programs controls the map contents, update/delete timing, and trace/perf attach points (including NMI-capable hooks), so the unsafe bpf_obj_free_fields() recycle path is triggerable without luck or victim-specific state.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Exploitation requires loading tracing/perf BPF programs with BTF maps holding kptr/list/uptr fields (CAP_BPF plus CAP_PERFMON), which bpf_token_capable() grants to user-namespace CAP_SYS_ADMIN holders (e.g. unshare -Urn) and delegated BPF token users, not only init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim interaction is required; the attacker triggers map recycle from their own loaded BPF program or concurrent bpf() map operations during tracing/perf events they control.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact stays within kernel memory and privilege boundaries (deadlock, oops, memory corruption, potential local privilege escalation) and does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU security scopes on its own.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Recycling map values from NMI/atomic tracing context runs bpf_obj_free_fields() kptr destructors, uptr unpinning, and graph teardown unsafely, enabling use-after-free and inconsistent object lifetimes that can be turned into arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same unsafe recycle path performs non-NMI-safe kptr destructor calls, recursive __bpf_obj_drop_impl() graph freeing, and uptr unpinning from wrong context, giving plausible heap corruption and control-flow hijack primitives beyond a simple crash.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Calling bpf_obj_free_fields() from NMI/tracing contexts can deadlock on BPF/hash locks (documented IN-NMI lockdep failures in related BPF LRU fixes) or panic/oops via illegal page unpinning and destructor execution, fully denying kernel availability.