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CVE-2026-74270
handshake: Require admin permission for DONE command
Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem Documentation/netlink. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74270 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.100-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
ACCEPT and DONE are the two downcalls of the handshake genl family, both intended for use by the trusted handshake agent (tlshd). ACCEPT already requires GENL_ADMIN_PERM; DONE has no privilege check at all. The fd-lookup in handshake_nl_done_doit() only confirms that some pending handshake request exists for the supplied sockfd; it does not authenticate the sender. An unprivileged process that guesses or observes a valid sockfd can therefore submit a DONE with HANDSHAKE_A_DONE_STATUS == 0, leaving the kernel consumer to proceed as if the handshake succeeded. A non-zero status on a forged DONE tears down a legitimate in-flight handshake before tlshd can report its real result.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
Documentation/netlink/specs/handshake.yaml
net/handshake/genl.c
- What this is
- HANDSHAKE UPCALL FOR TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITYMAINTAINERS section matched on Documentation/netlink/specs/handshake.yaml · kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev · Maintained
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this code. Every release with an answer below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm?
- trixie, forky, sidy
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- y
- built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switch
- CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.13%, higher than 2.2% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- Documentation/netlink
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4 | 6.6.145 | 25fb53e43ec0 |
| 6.4 | 6.12.97 | b6557f912509 |
| 6.4 | 6.18.40 | 67cec2f1eb9e |
| 6.4 | 7.1.5 | 4dafc4119484 |
| 6.4 | 7.2 | 81246a65303d |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- Exploitation requires sending a HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE generic-netlink message via a local netlink socket to handshake_nl_done_doit(); although nfsd and nvmet-tcp are network-facing, the vulnerable control-plane downcall is not reachable from remote packets.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Once a process holds a sockfd for a socket with a pending handshake request, forging DONE with status 0 or a failure status is a single deterministic netlink operation; the commit describes sockfd guessing/observation as sufficient and no special timing beyond normal concurrency is required.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Before the fix, HANDSHAKE_CMD_DONE lacked GENL_ADMIN_PERM while ACCEPT required it, so any unprivileged local user with netlink access could invoke the handler without CAP_NET_ADMIN in the initial user namespace or any other elevated capability.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Exploitation does not require victim interaction such as opening files or mounting filesystems; the attacker sends a forged DONE netlink message directly to complete or abort an in-flight kernel handshake.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Impact is confined to kernel TLS handshake state for local socket consumers (NFS RPC-over-TLS, NVMe-oF TCP TLS); it does not cross a VM, container, or IOMMU security boundary into a different authority.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- A forged DONE with HANDSHAKE_A_DONE_STATUS==0 makes kernel consumers proceed as if tlshd completed TLS successfully, bypassing X.509/PSK peer verification on NFS and NVMe-oF TCP sessions and undermining confidentiality of protected network storage traffic.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The attacker can supply arbitrary HANDSHAKE_A_DONE_REMOTE_AUTH peer-identity values with a forged success, causing nfsd/nvmet to mark connections as TLS-authenticated and continue I/O under false security assumptions, corrupting integrity of access-control decisions.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- A forged DONE with non-zero status calls handshake_complete() with an error, tearing down legitimate in-flight handshakes before tlshd reports the real result and denying or disrupting TLS session establishment on NFS/NVMe-oF TCP services.