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CVE-2026-74269
bnxt: fix head underflow on XDP head-grow
Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-74269 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | vulnerable | 6.12.113-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
The xdp.py test test_xdp_native_adjst_head_grow_data crashes when run on a bnxt machine (and also crashes in NIPA). It seems that the bug is an underflow in bnxt_rx_multi_page_skb, which builds the skb head: napi_build_skb(data_ptr - bp->rx_offset, rxr->rx_page_size); The problem with this expression is that in page mode, rx_offset is: bp->rx_offset = NET_IP_ALIGN + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; Which evaluates (at least on x86_64) to 258. The test test_xdp_native_adjst_head_grow_data tests a case where the head is adjusted by -256. When this test runs, data_ptr is shifted to frag_start + 2 (where frag_start = page_address(page) + offset). Then, bnxt_rx_multi_page_skb is invoked and the napi_build_skb expression subtracts 258, landing at an address before frag_start. This could be either the previous fragment or the previous physical page when the offset is < 256 (e.g. if the fragment started at offset 0). When the skb is freed, the page pool fragment reference is dropped on either the wrong page or the wrong frag of the right page. In either case, the corrupted reference count can lead to the page being prematurely recycled while still in use. Once (incorrectly) recycled, it can be handed out again and on driver teardown this would result in a double free. The commit under fixes updated this code to handle the case where the native page size is >= 64k, but it unintentionally broke the head grow case. To fix this, add an offset field to struct bnxt_sw_rx_bd, mirroring the existing offset field in struct bnxt_sw_rx_agg_bd. Populate it on allocation and preserve it on reuse. In bnxt_rx_multi_page_skb, use the newly added offset field to compute the fragment start and pass that to napi_build_skb. Adjust the layout with skb_reserve. There are two cases, the non-adjustment case and the adjustment case. In both cases, the skb is built at page_address(page) + offset to account for the case where the native page size >= 64K and skb_reserve is called with data_ptr - (page_address(page) + offset). That difference equals bp->rx_offset when data_ptr was not moved, or bp->rx_offset + xdp_adjust when XDP adjusted the head. Re-running the failing test with this commit applied causes the test to run successfully to completion. The other rx_skb_func implementations don't have this issue.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h
- What this is
- BROADCOM BNXT_EN 50 GIGABIT ETHERNET DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- bnxt_en
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_BNXT|CONFIG_ETHERNET|CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROADCOM' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w bnxt_enPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- trixieMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, armel/rpi
- forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_BNXT, CONFIG_ETHERNET, CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROADCOM
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.65%, higher than 50.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/net
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.5 | 6.18.53 | 4c03275bc443 |
| 6.5 | 7.1.5 | bb72b1c67556 |
| 6.5 | 7.2 | e26657fe3b85 |
| 6.1.45 | 0 | 0 |
| 6.4.10 | 0 | 0 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- The flaw is reached in bnxt hardware RX/NAPI processing when network packets arrive; the reproducing selftest triggers it by exchanging UDP packets over the network after XDP head-grow on receive.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Once a bnxt interface runs XDP multi-buffer with jumbo MTU, an attacker can reliably trigger bpf_xdp_adjust_head(-256) with packets larger than rx_copybreak (256 bytes); no race or attacker-uncontrollable memory layout is required.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The vulnerable receive path performs no authentication on incoming packets. Attaching the XDP program and enabling jumbo MTU are deployment preconditions on affected bnxt servers, not privileges the remote attacker needs.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- After the affected bnxt interface is configured with XDP and jumbo MTU, exploitation requires only sending crafted network traffic; no additional victim action such as opening files or mounting filesystems is needed.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Impact is kernel memory corruption and denial of service within the host networking stack. This is standard in-kernel privilege/integrity impact, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-security-boundary violation.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Pointer underflow builds the skb on the wrong page-pool fragment or prior physical page, corrupting refcount accounting and allowing pages to be recycled while still referenced, yielding a use-after-free that can expose kernel memory.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Corrupted page-pool reference counts can prematurely recycle receive buffers still in use and lead to double-free on teardown, providing exploitable kernel heap memory corruption beyond a simple crash.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The bug crashes bnxt systems during XDP head-grow testing and can be triggered repeatedly via received traffic, causing kernel oops, resource exhaustion, or panic especially when panic_on_warn is enabled.